Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 

in  2008  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


littp://www.arcliive.org/details/bolslievikaimsideOOnewyricli 


BOLSHEVIK  AIMS  AND  IDEALS 

AND 

RUSSIA'S  REVOLT  AGAINST 

BOLSHEVISM 


THE  ROUND  TABLE 

A  Quarterly  Review  of  the  Politics  of  the 
British  Commonwealth. 

"  The  Round  Table  "  is  a  co-operative  enterprise 
conducted  by  people  who  dwell  in  all  parts  of  the 
British  Commonwealth,  and  whose  aim  is  to  pub- 
lish once  a  quarter  a  comprehensive  review  of 
Imperial  politics,  entirely  free  from  the  bias  of 
local  party  issues,  together  with  articles  dealing 
with  foreign  and  inter-Imperial  problems  from  the 
Imperial  point  of  view.  In  keeping  with  this  pol- 
icy, opinions  and  articles  of  a  party  character  are 
rigidly  excluded.  The  affairs  of  "  The  Round  Ta- 
ble "  in  each  portion  of  the  Commonwealth  are  in 
the  hands  of  local  residents  who  are  responsible 
for  all  articles  on  the  politics  of  their  own  coun- 
try. In  this  way  "  The  Round  Table  "  reflects  the 
current  opinions  of  all  parts  about  Imperial  prob- 
lems, and  at  the  same  time  presents  a  survey  of 
them  as  a  whole. 

Issued  March,  June,  September 

and  December  of  each  year 

Single  copies,  $  .80 

FOR  SALE  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

64-66  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York. 


J 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

AND 

Russia's  Revolt  Against 
Bolshevism 


REPRINTED  FROM 

THE  ROUND  TABLE 


J13eto  gotb 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1919 

AU  rights  reserved 


-\\X^ 


"5 


BOLSHEVIK  AIMS  AND  IDEALS 

''  The  chief  task  which  we  set  ourselves  at  the 
fvery  beginning  of  the  war  was  to  turn  the  Im-  *-^ 
perialistic   war   into    a   civil   war  J' — Lenin    and 
Zinovieff,     Against     the     Current     (Petrograd, 

1918).  . 

''  Not  civil  peace,  but  civil  war  —  that  is  our 
watchword/'— From  a  letter  of  Liebknecht  to 
the  Zimmerwald  Conference. 

''The  programme  of  the  Communist  party  \^ 
(Bolsheviks)  is  the  programme  not  only  of  the 
liberation  of  the  proletariat  of  one  country.  It 
is  the  programme  of  the  liberation  of  the  pro- 
letariat of  all  countries,  because  it  is  the  pro- 
gramme of  international  revolution.  The  over- 
throw of  Imperialist  governments  by  means  of 
armed  revolt  is  the  road  to  the  international 
dictatorship  of  the  working-class.'' — Bucharin, 
Programme  of  the  Communists  (Moscow,  1918). 

In  spite  of  all  that  has  been  written  on  the 
subjecct  of   Bolshevism   there    still   exists   in   this 

5 


4(if^O!^5^ 


Bd^isiwmk.'Aims  and  Ideals 


country  a  •  depiGrable •  .and  altogether  regrettable 
ignorance  on  the  part  of  the  general  public  regard- 
ing the  character,  individuality,  and  aims  of  the 
Bolshevik  movement.  The  nature  of  the  infor- 
mation which  appears  in  our  daily  Press  is  so 
contradictory  and  the  frequent  change  of  policy, 
or  rather  the  absence  of  any  policy,  on  the  part 
of  the  Allied  Governments  so  bewildering  that 
the  man  in  the  street  is  inclined  to  abandon  all 
hope  of  ever  understanding  the  complex  picture 
which  Russia  now  presents  and  to  isolate  from 
his  intellectual  vision  a  problem  which,  unless-  it 
is  speedily  settled,  will  submerge  Europe  in  all 
the  horrors  of  a  civil  war  and  render  the  task 
of  the  Peace  Conference  sterile. 

Our  ignorance  of  the  Bolshevik  movement  is 
perhaps  not  altogether  unnatural.  In  the  fierce 
heat  of  the  civil  war  which  is  at  present  ravaging 
Eastern  Europe  it  is  hard  for  those  Russians  who 
are  opposed  to  the  Bolsheviks  to  suppress  the 
feelings  of  bitterness  which  rise  in  their  heart 
every  time  the  word  "  Bolshevik"  is  mentioned; 
there  are  unfortunately  only  very  few  who  pos- 
sess the  requisite  knowledge  to  treat  the  question 
in  a  scientific  and  authoritative  manner.  The 
problem  is  rendered  still  more  diflicult  by  the 
wide  divergence  of  political  opinion  which  exists 
amongst  the   Bolsheviks'   opponents,   who   range 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  7 

from  extreme   reactionaries  to  international  So- 
cialists of  the  type  of  Axelrode  and  Martoff. 

In  the  absence  of  a  united  statement  on  the 
part  of  all  the  Russian  parties  a  tendency  has 
arisen  in  this  country  to  divide  sympathies  with 
or  against  the  Bolsheviks  on  purely  party  lines. 
The  anti-Bolshevik  campaign  has  been  conducted 
mainly  by  that  section  of  the  Press  which  is  most 
open  to  attack  on  the  score  of  capitalistic  bias 
and  commercial  interest.  It  is  also  the  section 
which  is  most  opposed  to  concessions  to  Labour. 
Its  campaign,  too,  has  not  always  been  conducted 
impartially  and  has  not  always  been  free  from 
a  suspicion  of  secret  sympathy  with  the  old 
regime.  Rumours  have  been  published  which 
have  afterwards  had  to  be  denied,  and  there  has 
been  a  most  unfortunate  misuse  in  the  applica- 
tion of  the  epithet  ''  Bolshevik  "  to  parties  and  in- 
dividuals in  this  country  who  have  not  only  noth- 
ing in  common  with  the  Bolsheviks,  but  have 
frequently  been  denounced  in  the  Bolshevik  offi- 
cial Press  in  Russia  as  renegades  and  Socialist- 
traitors.  One  consequence  of  this  campaign  has 
been  to  produce  in  Labour  and  Radical  circles 
a  deep-rooted  suspicion  of  all  information  emana- 
ting from  that  section  of  the  Press  and  a  tendency 
to  regard  the  Bolsheviks  as  the  champions  of 
democracy  against  autocracy.     The  reaction  thus 


8  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

produced  has  resulted  in  a  most  unfortunate  con- 
fusion of  ideas,  which  has  been  further  increased 
by  the  vexed  question  of  Allied  intervention. 

If  those  newspapers  have  grossly  exaggerated 
the  German  character  of  the  Bolshevik  move- 
ment, the  Labour  and  Radical  Press  has  been 
equally  guilty  in  its  attempts  to  "  whitewash  "  the 
Bolsheviks  as  the  protagonists  of  democracy  and 
open  diplomacy.  To-day,  we  all  recognise  the 
futility  of  labelling  Lenin  a  German  agent,  but  it 
is  of  paramount  importance  that  such  "  shibbo- 
leths "  as  "  Bolshevism  means  nothing  more 'than 
the  rule  of  the  majority  "  should  be  denounced 
and  exposed.  Indeed,  the  most  casual  reference 
to  the  official  Bolshevik  Press  will  prove  that 
many  apologists  for  the  Bolsheviks  have  endeav- 
ored to  attribute  to  the  Bolshevik  leaders  char- 
acteristics which  the  latter  themselves  would  be 
the  first  to  denounce  and  to  cover  with  derision. 

The  need  in  this  country  for  a  purely  historical 
analysis  of  the  Bolshevik  movement  is  most 
urgent,  and,  although  a  question  of  this  impor- 
tance can  only  be  treated  properly  in  a  work  of 
considerable  magnitude,  the  object  of  the  follow- 
ing article  is  to  give,  as  fairly  as  possible,  a  brief 
outline  of  the  origin,  aims,  and  ideals  of  the  men 
who  have  been  responsible  for  the  Bolshevik  ex- 
periment in  Russia  during  the  past  fifteen  months. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 


I.     The  Origin  of  the  Bolsheviks 

The  history  of  the  first  beginnings  of  the  social- 
democratic  movement  in  Russia  has  yet  to  be 
written.  Until  the  March  revolution  of  19 17  the 
strictness  of  the  Russian  censorship  and  the  close 
surveillance  of  all  socialistic  agitation  by  the  secret 
police  made  It  difficult  and  even  dangerous  for 
the  impartial  foreign  observer  to  carry  out  any 
serious  investigations,  and  the  most .  instructive 
literature  on  the  subject  was  subterranean  and 
unavailable  to  the  general  public.  Although  the 
doctrine  of  Marx  had  permeated  Russian  Intel- 
lectual circles  many  years  before,  it  was  not  until 
1898  that  any  serious  attempt  was  made  to  form 
an  all-Russian  Social-Democratic  Party.  In 
1898,  however,  the  various  Social-Democratic 
groups,  which  were  already  in  existence,  met  at 
Minsk  and  formed  there  a  single  party  to  be 
known  in  future  as  the  "  Russian  Social-Demo- 
cratic Labour  Party."  Although  the  Central 
Committee,  chosen  at  this  Congress,  was  soon  ar- 
rested, the  party  made  great  progress  during  the 
next  five  years,  and  the  number  of  branches 
throughout  Russia  increased  with  striking  rapid- 
ity; so  much  so,  in  fact,  that  even  before  the 
revolution   every   working-man's   vote   in   Russia 


lo  "Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

was  cast  for  Socialism  —  a  thing  which  cannot  be 
said  of  this  country.  The  second  Congress  of 
the  party  took  place  In  July  and  August  of  1903, 
first  at  Brussels  and  later  at  London.  The  task 
of  this  Congress,  which  was  largely  attended,  was 
to  ^x  the  rules  and  statutes  of  the  party  organisa- 
tion and  to  work  out  a  political  programme, 
formulating  as  its  chief  demands  the  creation  of 
a  Democratic  Republic  and  the  summoning  of  a 
Constituent  Assembly.  The  proceedings,  how- 
ever, were  somewhat  stormy  and  revealed  at  once 
a  deep  and  radical  difference  of  opinion  on  ques- 
tions of  party  organisation.  One  party,  headed 
by  Lenin,  demanded  a  more  thorough  centrali- 
sation of  power  In  the  hands  of  the  Executive 
Committee,  a  rigorous  suppression  of  all  Inde- 
pendent activities,  and  a  severer  code  of  rules  for 
membership  of  the  party.  The  other  group,  led 
by  Martoff,  defended  the  democratic  principle  of 
organisation  and  desired  a  further  development 
of  independence  on  the  part  of  the  local  organisa- 
tions. Further  differences  of  opinion  existed  re- 
garding the  policy  to  be  adopted  in  the  event  of 
a  successful  revolution.  The  supporters  of  the 
Martoff  group  were  pr^ared  to  concede  to  the 
Liberal  bourgeoisie  at  any  rate  a  temporary  justi- 
fication of  their  existence,  but  Lenin  maintained 
that  the   overthrow   of  Tsardom   by   the   aid   of 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  II 

the  bourgeoisie  and  the  establishment  of  a  demo- 
cratic republic  would  not  oft^  weaken  the  domina- 
tion of  the  capitalists  but  would  actually  increase 
it.  These  differences  of  opinion  led  to  a  definite 
breach  and,  as  at  this  particular  Congress  the 
majority  or  "  bolshinstvo  "  of  the  delegates  voted 
with  Lenin,  they  were  known  subsequently  as  the 
"  bolsheviki,"  while  the  minority  or  ''  men- 
shinstvo  "  were  labelled  "  mensheviki."  This  is 
the  real  origin  of  the  Bolsheviks,  and,  although 
the  word  "  Bolshevism,"  which  has  been  created 
to  describe  the  doctrine  of  the  Bolsheviks,  has 
an  entirely  different  signification,  "  Bolshevik  "  in 
its  original  sense  has  no  further  meaning  than 
that  which  has  just  been  explained.  To  state 
that  "  Bolshevism  "  means  "  the  rule  of  the  ma- 
jori'ty  "  is  simply  absurd  and  shows  a  complete 
ignorance  both  of  the  character  of  Bolshevism 
and  of  the  Russian  language. 

During  the  revolution  of  1905  further  attempts 
were  made  to  bring  the  two  parties  together. 
These  attempts,  however,  met  with  only  a  very 
temporary  success,  and  to-day  the  two  parties 
stand  in  a  violent  opposition,  which  has  been  ren- 
dered still  more  bitter  by  the  ruthless  suppression 
of  the  Menshevik  Press  and  the  expulsion  of  the 
Menshevik  leaders  from  the  Soviets. 

Since   1905  the  Bolsheviks  have  travelled  far 


12  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

in  their  revolutionary  journey  to  the  extreme  left. 
In  the  words  of  one  of  their  own  leaders,  the 
difference  between  a  Bolshevik  and  a  Menshevik 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  one  has  the  courage  of 
his  convictions  and  the  other  has  not.  A  truer 
definition  would  be  that  the  Menshevik  is  guided 
by  democratic  principles  and  upholds  the  free 
expression  of  the  human  will,  while  to  the  Bolshe- 
vik democracy  is  only  a  capitalist  "  shibboleth  " 
and  is  in  reality  a  bar  to  all  social  progress.  At 
a.ny  rate  the  Bolshevik  of  to-day  has  erased  the 
word  democracy  from  his  party's  title,  and  his 
policy  may  be  justly  described  as  the  immediate 
establishment  of  communism  by  violent  methods. 
Whilst  the  Menshevik  shrinks  before  the  appal- 
ling tragedy  of  civil  war,  the  Bolshevik  stands  for 
the  merciless  destruction  of  the  bourgeoisie  by 
means  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and 
for  the  international  Bolshevik  revolution. 

This  difference  between  the  Bolsheviks  and 
other  Socialists  is  accurately  described  by  Bucha- 
rin,  one  of  the  leading  Bolsheviks,  in  his  book 
The  Programme  of  the  Bolshevik  Communists 
(Moscow,    19 18). 

Our  party  (he  writes),  until  the  last  Congress,  was 
called  the  Social-Democratic  Party.  Throughout  the 
world  all  parties  of  the  working-classes  bore  this  name. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  13 

The  war,  however,  has  created  an  unprecedented  split  in 
the  ranks  of  the  social-democratic  parties,  and  here  we  now 
find  three  distinct  tendencies  —  an  extreme  right,  a  centre, 
and  an  extreme  left.  The  right  social-democrats  are  real 
traitors  to  the  working-classes.  They  lick  the  boots  of 
generals  stained  with  working-men's  blood.  Of  these 
"  gentlemen  "  there  is  a  large  number  in  France  and  Eng- 
land. .  .  .  The  second  tendency  is  the  centre.  This 
group  agitates  against  its  governments,  but  is  incapable 
of  carr^ang  on  a  revolutionar}"  struggle.  It  cannot  make 
up  its  mind  to  call  the  workmen  into  the  streets.  It 
fears  like  fire  the  armed  struggle  which  alone  can  decide 
the  question.  Finally,  there  is  the  third  tendency  —  that 
of  the  extreme  left.  In  Germany  this  group  is  repre- 
sented by  Liebknecht  and  his  friends.  '  These  are  the 
foreign  Bolsheviks.  Their  tactics,  their  views,  are  our 
tactics  and  our  views. 

In  Russia,  when  in  October  the  revolutionary  struggle 
and  the  development  of  the  revolution  set  at  stake  the 
establishment  of  socialism  and  the  overthrow  of  bourgeois 
power,  the  struggle  between  the  socialist-traitors  and 
the  supporters  of  socialism  had  to  be  decided  by  force 
of  arms.  The  right  social  revolutionaries  and  the  Men- 
sheviks  were  on  one  side  of  the  barricades  with  all  the 
counter-revolutionary  swine;  the  Bolsheviks  were  on  the 
other  side  with  the  workmen  and  soldiers.  Blood  has 
created  a  gulf  between  us.  This  is  not  forgotten  and 
never  will  be  forgotten.  That  is  why  we  have  had  to 
give  our  party  another  name  in  order  to  distinguish  us 
from  these  traitors  of  socialism.  Too  great  is  the  dis- 
tance that  separates  us.  Too  different  are  our  paths 
and  theirs. 


14  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

This  Is  typical  Bolshevik  propaganda  and  fur- 
nishes an  excellent  example  of  the  Bolshevik 
method  of  uncompromising  attack  on  all  those 
who  do  not  share  their  views.  There  is  only 
one  socialism  —  Bolshevik  socialism  —  and  all 
other  forms  of  socialism  are  merely  a  betrayal 
of  the  working-class.  This  can  be  amplified  by 
countless  quotations  from  the  speeches  and  ar- 
ticles of  Lenin,  in  which  he  turns  and  reviles 
those  who  were  once  his  colleagues:  Plechanoff, 
Axelrode,  Martofi,  Kautsky,  Guesde,  Trotsky  be- 
fore his  conversion,  and  many  others  too  numer- 
ous to  mention.  To  the  Bolshevik  as  to  the 
Mohammedan  the  world  is  divided  Into  the  faith- 
ful and  the  infidel,  and  by  the  Bolshevik, 
reactionaries.  Liberals,  democrats,  social-revolu- 
tionaries, Mensheviks,  and  even  extreme  Socialists 
of  a  different  revolutionary  character  are  classified 
under  the  one  heading  of  "  counter-revolution- 
ary." 

IL     Bolshevik  Leaders 

A  well-known  French  psychologist  has  thus 
defined  the  part  of  the  people  in  revolutionary 
struggles :  "  The  part  of  the  people  has  been  the 
same  In  all  revolutions.  It  is  never  the  people 
that  conceives  them  or  directs  them.  Its  activity 
is  released  by  means   of  leaders."     This   Is   es- 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  15 

pecially  true  of  a  country  like  Russia,  where  nearly 
eighty  per  cent,  of  the  population  is  totally  illiter- 
ate, and  no  review  of  the  Bolshevik  revolution  in 
Russia  can  be  attempted  without  some  reference 
to  the  character  and  psychology  of  the  men  who 
have  inspired  and  carried  through  that  revolu- 
tion. It  must  be  frankly  admitted  that  these 
leaders,  however  fanatical  they  may  be,  are  per- 
fectly genuine  and  sincere  in  their  beliefs.  Many 
of  them  have  suffered  years  of  exile  and  imprison- 
ment. Some  have  already  perished  for  their  con- 
victions. A  few  again  are  men  who  were  born 
to  riches  but  who  have  abandoned  all  hope  of 
personal  fortune  in  the  interests  of  their  cause. 
And  to-day,  at  all  events,  they  have  all  burned 
their  boats  and  know  well  the  fate  that  awaits 
them  in  the  event  of  their  overthrow.  They  have 
shown  no  mercy.  They  neither  expect  it  nor 
claim  it  for  themselves. 

As  men  many  of  the  leaders  belong  undoubt- 
edly to  that  class  of  professional  rebel  whose 
mind  has  been  contorted  and  perverted  by  per- 
sonal suffering  and  by  the  difficulties  that  have 
beset  his  own  existence.  Men  of  this  kind  have 
no  country,  have  never  had  any  country,  and  are 
genuinely  international  in  their  oudook.  Al- 
though it  would  be  unfair  to  state  that  such  men 
are   influenced  by  the   feeling  of   revenge,   their 


1 6  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

minds  are  swayed,  perhaps  subconsciously,  by  the 
thought  that  the  revolution  has  now  given  them 
the  opportunity  of  getting  their  own  back  on  a 
world  in  which  they  have  suffered  greatly.  It  is 
only  natural  that  in  a  country  hke  the  pre-revolu- 
tionary  Russia  a  large  percentage  of  such  men 
should  be  found  among  the  Jewish  population, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  Jews  to  a  very  large 
extent  control  and  provide  the  working  machinery 
of  the  Bolshevik  party.  Of  the  twelve  leading 
Bolshevik  commissars  eight  are  Jews,  and  there 
is  a  certain  significance  in  the  fact  that  they  have 
seen  fit  to  retain  even  to-day  the  Russian  pseu- 
donyms which  they  had  formerly  adopted  as  a 
measure  of  protection  from  the  police.  Amongst 
the  smaller  officials  of  the  Bolshevik  commis- 
sariats the  percentage  of  Jews  is  probably  even 
higher.  To  avoid  any  misinterpretation  it  should 
be  pointed  out  that  there  is  also  a  high  percentage 
of  Jews  both  in  the  Menshevik  and  social-revo- 
lutionary parties  and  also  in  the  Cadet  party, 
while  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  assassination 
of  Count  Mirbach  and  the  Bolshevik  commissar 
Uritsky  and  the  attempt  on  Lenin's  life  were  in 
each  instance  carried  out  by  anti-Bolshevik  Jewish 
Socialists. 

Although  in  its  inception  the  Bolshevik  move- 
ment was  a  purely  intellectual  movement,  which 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  17 

even  to-day  Is  still  entirely  controlled  by  men  of 
the  upper  and  lower  middle-classes  who  have 
never  worked  with  their  hands,  there  Is  another 
type  of  Bolshevik  supporter  which  Is  to  be  found 
amongst  that  section  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
proletariat  which  Is  genuinely  Bolshevik  in  Its 
sympathies.  This  Is  the  educated  or  semi-edu- 
cated workman  who  In  Russia  has  been  educated 
secretly  by  the  Bolsheviks  and  who,  never  having 
known  any  other  form  of  education,  believes 
whole-heartedly  In  the  every  letter  of  his  Lenin- 
ised  Marxism  in  much  the  same  way  as  an  un- 
educated Mtihammedan  accepts  the  every  letter  of 
the  Koran.  To  men  of  this  type,  and,  Indeed, 
to  many  of  the  intellectual  leaders,  Bolshevism 
is  a  belief,  akin  to  a  religious  belief,  which  has 
nothing  In  common  with  rational  logic  and  which 
Is  accepted  without  discussion.  It  is  only  when 
we  admit  the  irrational  character  of  this  belief 
that  we  can  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  the 
terror  and  of  the  numerous  outrages  committed 
by  the  Bolsheviks  In  the  name  of  socialism. 

Another  type  of  Bolshevik  supporter  is  the 
mystical  Socialist  who  has  no  very  firm  party  con- 
victions. These  men  accept  Bolshevism  more  for 
Its  ideals  than  for  its  methods,  but  chiefly,  perhaps, 
because  it  is  the  line  of  least  resistance  and  be- 
cause  the   Bolsheviks   have   been   the   victorious 


1 8  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

party.  Such  men  are  not  devoid  of  humane  feel- 
ings. They  are  probably  opposed  in  principle  to 
all  acts  of  terror,  but  through  the  weakness  of 
their  own  character  their  individuality  is  entirely 
submerged  when  it  comes  into  contact  with  the 
powerful  environment  of  their  more  daring  col- 
leagues. Their  votes  are  cast  wuth  the  majority, 
and  for  the  acts  of  that  majority  they  must  share 
full  responsibility. 

Much  has  been  written  in  the  foreign  Press 
of  the  criminal  elements  in  the  Bolshevik  move- 
ment. Few  honest  observers  will  deny  that  there 
has  been  very  considerable  exaggeration  in  this 
connection,  and  it  should  be  admitted  that  most, 
if  not  all,  of  the  genuine  leaders  are  entirely  free 
from  the  taint  of  corruption.  All  civilised  so- 
cieties, however,  possess  to  a  larger  or  smaller 
degree  a  residue  of  degenerates  and  criminals, 
and  in  this  respect  Russia  was  assuredly  in  no 
better  position  than  any  of  her  Western  neigh- 
bours. The  Bolshevik  revolution  gave  to  this 
class  an  unrivalled  opportunity  of  satisfying  its 
lowest  instincts,  and  many  detestable  and  thor- 
oughly worthless  elements  have  undoubtedly 
wormed  their  way  into  minor  but  nevertheless 
powerful  posts  under  Bolshevik  employment. 
The  Bolsheviks  themselves  admit  this,  and  one 
has  only  to  study  the  files  of  the  Bolshevik  Press 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  19 

to  see  how  frequent  are  the  cases  of  theft  and 
robbery  on  the  part  of  minor  Soviet  officials.  In 
an  uneducated  country  like  Russia,  where  corrup- 
tion has  always  been  rife,  the  Bolshevik  efforts  to 
cleanse  their  administration  have  been  attended 
by  only  partial  success,  and  even  to-day  there  is 
little  in  the  shape  of  false  passports,  Bolshevik 
documents,  provisions,  grain,  eggs,  butter,  in  a 
word,  of  anything  over  which  the  Bolshevik  em- 
ployees have  control,  even  life  and  death,  which 
cannot  be  bought  for  a  price. 

When  all  is  said  and  done,  however,  the  Bol- 
shevik party  remains  to  a  large  extent  a  one-man 
party.  That  one  man  is  Lenin.  Whatever  his 
faults  may  be,  few  who  have  been  brought  into 
contact  with  him  will  deny  that  he  is  in  many 
respects  a  remarkable  man.  Some  day  he  may 
possibly  rank  as  a  great  man,  and  his  place  in 
history  will  assuredly  be  as  provocative  of  dis- 
cussion and  of  violent  controversy  as  that  of  the 
Jacobins  of  the  French  revolution.  His  claim 
to  greatness  is  not  to  be  based  on  the  success  of 
his  revolution  in  Russia  nor  yet  on  his  powers  as 
a  mob-orator.  There  have  been  greater  dema- 
gogues than  Lenin.  History,  too,  knows  many 
examples  of  men  who  have  been  able  to  enjoy 
temporary  power  by  means  of  extravagant  prom- 
ises of  universal  prosperity   and  by  playing   on 


20  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

the  Instincts  of  passion  and  hatred.  Lenin  has  all 
the  attributes  necessary  to  the  demagogue,  has 
made  use  of  all  the  demagogue's  arts,  but  his 
dominating  influence  in  the  Bolshevik  party  is  due 
to  other  qualities.  Quite  apart  from  his  very  con- 
siderable intellectual  powers,  his  chief  asset  as 
a  leader  is  his  undoubted  courage  —  his  almost 
fanatical  confidence  in  his  own  judgment.  Older 
than  most  of  his  colleagues,  who  are  nearly  all 
well  under  forty,  he  is  at  once  the  dictator  and 
the  professor  of  the  whole  movement.  His  ap- 
pearances in  public  are  comparatively  rare,  but 
from  his  shelter  in  the  Kremlin  he  controls  and 
guides  each  department  of  his  government  in  a 
manner,  which,  while  never  actually  suggesting 
the  presence  of  a  dictator,  is  rarely  challenged. 
Alone  of  all  the  Bolshevik  leaders  he  enjoys  to 
a  remarkable  degree  the  respect  of  his  colleagues, 
and  it  is  his  Influence  alone  which  has  kept  the 
party  together  and  put  a  check  on  the  mutual 
jealousies  and  rivalries  that  are  so  common  In  all 
Russian  parties. 

His  chief  claim  to  greatness,  however,  lies  In 
the  fact  that  he  foresaw  sooner  and  more  clearly 
than  anyone  else  that  pathological  state  of  unrest 
and  discontent  into  which  the  whole  world  was 
to  be  plunged  as  the  result  of  four  years  of  un- 
precedented warfare.     From  the  first  day  of  the 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  21 

outbreak  of  hostilities  he  realised  the  reaction 
which  the  war  was  bound  to  produce,  and  he 
began  at  once  to  prepare  his  machinery  for  ex- 
ploiting that  reaction  in  the  interests  of  his  own 
aims.  The  Russian  revolution  of  March,  19 17, 
gave  him  his  chance.  He  was  not  influenced  in 
any  way  by  national  sentiments.  National  war- 
fare was  merely  an  instrument  to  be  exploited  in 
the  interests  of  the  great  class  war  which  was  and 
always  has  been  his  ultimate  aim.  To  attain  that 
goal  any  means  were  justifiable,  and,  if  the  Ger- 
mans were  foolish  enough  to  send  him  back  to 
Russia  through  Germany,  to  a  man  of  Lenin's 
point  of  view  there  was  nothing  dishonourable 
in  the  acceptance  of  such  an  offer.  Capital  was 
the  root  of  all  evils,  and  all  capitalist  govern- 
ments were  alike.  Where  there  was  a  capitalist 
domination,  for  the  genuine  Socialist  there  could 
be  no  such  thing  as  patriotism.  Therefore,  those 
Socialists,  not  only  in  Germany,  but  also  in  the 
Entente  countries,  who  supported  the  war  in  the 
name  of  self-defence,  were  traitors  to  Socialism 
and  agents  of  the  capitalist  Imperialists.  He 
realised  from  the  first  that  his  whole  existence 
was  based  on  his  power  to  give  Russia  peace  and 
on  his  ability  to  consolidate  his  position  until  he 
could  turn,  as  he  himself  has  always  said,  "  the 
Imperialist  war  into  a  civil  war."     As  long  as 


22  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

the  Allies  and  Germany  were  engaged  in  killing 
one  another  —  in  fact,  if  only  the  war  would 
last  long  enough  until  the  peoples  of  Europe  were 
thoroughly  tired  of  war,  he  felt  that  he  had  every- 
thing to  gain  and  that,  no  matter  how  humiliating 
the  terms  might  be,  peace  with  Germany  was 
essential  to  the  triumph  of  his  cause.  Time,  he 
felt,  was  on  his  side,  and  he  gambled  on  general 
exhaustion  and  on  an  inconclusive  and  indefinite 
result  to  the  war.  In  order  to  achieve  his  peace 
he  had  to  destroy  In  the  minds  of  the  Russian 
people  any  sentimental  prejudice  In  favour  of  the 
Allies.  His  bitter  agitation  against  the  Entente 
during  the  Kerensky  regime  was  conducted  far 
more  from  this  point  of  view  than  from  any  sub- 
sidised subservience  to  the  desires  of  the  Imperial 
German  Government. 

Some  people  in  this  country  are  under  the  im- 
pression that  the  Bolsheviks  genuinely  desired 
universal  peace.  This  Is  another  "  shibboleth  " 
which  shows  how  faulty  has  been  our  interpreta- 
tion of  the  Bolshevik  ideal.  The  Bolshevik  offer 
of  universal  peace  was  a  mere  pretence  which 
they  knew  and  calculated  would  be  refused.  If 
there  be  any  who  are  still  In  doubt  upon  this  point, 
they  may  be  referred  to  the  preface  of  Lenin 
and  ZInovIeff's  Against  the  Current,  from  which 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  23 

the  following  quotation  gives  the  direct  answer  to 
this  question: 

In  the  discussions  (at  Zimmerwald  in  191 5)  regarding 
the  question  —  what  would  the  Proletariat  Party  do  if  a 
revolution  were  to  put  it  in  power  during  the  present  war  ? 
—  we  (i.e.,  Lenin  and  Zinovieff)  replied:  "we  would 
offer  peace  to  all  the  combatants  on  the  basis  of  the  libera- 
tion of  the  colonies  and  of  all  dependent,  down-trodden 
and  subject  races.  Neither  Germany  nor  France  nor 
England  would  accept  these  terms  under  their  present 
governments.  We  would  then  prepare  (after  a  separate 
peace  with  Germany,  of  course)  to  carry  out  in  full  by 
the  most  decisive  measures  our  minimum  programme, 
and  also  systematically  to  stir  up  revolt  amongst  all  the 
peoples  at  present  oppressed  by  the  great  Russians, 
amongst  the  colonies  and  dependent  countries  of  Asia, 
India,  China,  Persia,  etc.,  and  also,  above  all,  to  call  to 
arms  the  Socialist  proletariat  of  Europe  against  their 
Governments  and  in  spite  of  their  chauvinist  Socialists. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  victory  of  the  proletariat  in 
Russia  would  create  exceptionally  favourable  conditions 
for  the  development  of  revolution  both  in  Asia  and  in 
Europe." 

The  continuation  of  the  war  between  Germany 
and  the  Allies  was  essential  to  the  success  of  the 
Bolshevik  experiment  in  Russia.  This  has  been 
admitted  on  more  than  one  occasion  by  different 
Bolshevik  leaders,  and  the  "  credit  "  for  Russia's 
separate  peace  is  due  entirely  to  Lenin.     In  Febru- 


24  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

ary  of  191 8,  when  many  of  the  Bolsheviks,  in- 
cluding Trotsky,  seemed  inclined  to  accept  a  war 
with  Germany,  which  to  them  seemed  unavoid- 
able, and  which,  since  they  had  destroyed  the 
army,  could  not  have  failed  to  destroy  them, 
Lenin  stood  steadfast  for  peace  even  if  it  meant 
the  loss  of  the  richest  parts  of  Russia.  And  from 
the  Bolshevik  point  of  view  Lenin  was  undoubt- 
edly right. 

It  is  important  to  realise  this  all-powerful 
domination  of  Lenin.  Trotsky,  who  until  the 
revolution  hovered  with  a  small  party  of  his  own 
mid-way  between  the  Mensheviks  and  the  Bolshe- 
viks, possesses  neither  the  same  self-confidence  nor 
the  same  fixity  of  purpose  as  his  more  far-seeing 
colleague,  and  too  much  importance  should  not 
be  attributed  to  the  frequent  rumours  of  quarrels 
between  the  two  men.  Trotsky's  genius  lies 
rather  in  his  enormous  capacity  for  work  and  in 
his  love  of  action.  Lenin,  however,  is  the  Bol- 
shevik law-giver,  the  framer  of  the  Bolshevik 
decrees,  and  the  author  of  the  Bolshevik  Consti- 
tution. If,  then,  we  wish  to  understand  the  funda- 
mental aims  and  ideals  which  underlie  Bolshevik 
policy,  it  is  on  the  writings  of  Lenin  rather  than 
to  the  propaganda  work  of  Radek  and  Trotsky 
that  we  should  rivet  our  attention. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  25 


III.     Bolshevik  Aspirations 

Although  the  Bolsheviks  came  into  power  solely 
on  account  of  their  peace  programme,  the  wreck 
of  the  great  army  which  supported  them  knew 
little  of  its  new  masters  beyond  the  fact  that  the 
latter  had  promised  a  famished  and  war-weary 
country  the  millennium:  land,  bread,  and  peace. 
It  is  not  the  intention  of  this  article,  nor  indeed 
does  space  permit,  to  describe  even  in  outline  the 
various  crises  through  which  the  Bolshevik  gov- 
ernment has  passed  during  its  fifteen  months' 
existence.  Put  very  briefly,  the  Bolshevik  reign 
may  be  divided  into  two  periods:  first,  the  an- 
archic period  from  November,  19 17,  to  April, 
19 1 8,  during  which  the  Bolsheviks,  by  fanning 
the  flame  of  class-hatred  and  by  pandering  to  the 
popular  favour  of  the  mob  and  of  the  returning 
army,  were  engaged  in  creating  the  necessary 
force  for  the  maintenance  of  their  own  existence 
and  for  the  consolidation  of  their  own  position; 
and,  secondly,  the  period  from  May,  19 18,  up  to 
the  present  moment  during  which  the  Bolsheviks 
have  attempted  by  violent  methods  to  force  their 
social  reforms  upon  a  population  a  large  propor- 
tion of  which  is  unwilling  to  accept  them.  During 
all  this  time  civil  war  has  raged  all  over  Russia 


/ 


26  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

with  an  ebb  and  flow  of  violence  which  to-day 
shows  no  signs  of  abating. 

In  these  pages,  however,  we  are  concerned 
solely  with  an  examination  of  the  real  aims  and 
aspirations  of  the  Bolsheviks.  In  this  connexion 
it  is  of  paramount  importance  for  the  foreign 
student  of  Bolshevism  to  realise  from  the  first  the 
essential  difference  between  the  fundamental 
policy  and  the  opportunist  policy  of  the  Bolshe- 
viks. The  Bolshevik  leaders  themselves  admit 
the  difference.  It  explains  the  many  inconsist- 
encies in  their  policy  —  inconsistencies  which  they 
do  not  deny  and  which  are  in  some  respects  not 
unnatural.  The  Bolsheviks  are  a  minority  party. 
They  are  supported  by  a  proletariat  which,  al- 
though inspired  with  a  genuine  revolutionary  en- 
thusiasm, is  very  largely  illiterate;  in  fact,  by 
elements  which  Lenin  himself  has  occasionally 
characterised  as  unsatisfactory  and  which  do  not 
always  understand  the  ideas  of  their  leaders.  In 
order  to  maintain  their  position,  the  Bolsheviks 
have  therefore  been  forced  into  frequent  incon- 
sistencies both  in  their  foreign  and  in  their  in- 
ternal policy.  As  one  of  the  leaders  of  the 
French  revolution  wrote,  many  of  the  decisions 
which  they  have  been  forced  to  take  "  were  more 
often  than  otherwise  not  intended  or  desired  by 
them  two  days  or  even  one  day  beforehand:  the 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  27 

crisis  alone  evoked  them."  They  have  "  beaten 
both  to  the  left  and  to  the  right."  In  one  part 
of  the  country  they  have  appealed  to  national 
sentiments;  in  another  part  they  have  denounced 
them  with  all  the  fervour  of  extreme  internation- 
alism. At  every  meeting  they  preach  the  gospel 
of  civil  war  and  of  no  compromise  with  capital- 
ism, and  at  the  same  time  their  wireless  is  flying 
kites  in  the  foreign  Press  regarding  the  gradual 
moderation  of  their  views  and  their  desire  for 
peace  with  the  Entente. 

In  his  fundamental  aims  and  aspirations,  how- 
ever, Lenin  is  and  always  has  been  thoroughly 
consistent.  His  one  aim  is  the  establishment  of 
communism  throughout  Europe  by  means  of  the 
international  Bolshevik  revolution.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  lay  stress  on  the  "  throughout  Europe," 
because  Lenin  himself  has  admitted  that  a  com- 
munist Russia  cannot  exist  alongside  a  capitalist 
Europe.  As  late  as  December  10,  1918,  we  find 
him  saying  in  a  speech  to  the  Congress  of  Poverty 
Committees:  "Our  chief  hope,  our  chief  sup- 
port, is  in  the  proletariat  of  Western  Europe, 
in  the  proletariat  of  the  more  advanced  countries." 
No  compromise  with  the  bourgeoisie  has  been  the 
"chief  tenet  of  Lenin's  political  beliefs  throughout 
his  whole  life,  and  paragraph  3  of  the  Soviet 
Constitution  defines  "  the  victory  of  Sociahsm  in 


28  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

all  countries  "  as  one  of  the  chief  aims  of  the 
Soviet  Republic.  There  is  nothing  to  show  that 
any  Bolshevik  statements  to  the  contrary  can  be 
regarded  in  the  light  of  anything  except  a  tempo- 
rary expedient  dictated  by  the  needs  of  the  mo- 
ment or  by  the  weakness  of  their  own  position 
and  violable  as  soon  as  circumstances  permit. 

In  Bolshevik  socialism  itself  there  is  little  that 
is  new.  "  We  have  returned,"  writes  Bucharin, 
"  to  the  old  name  of  the  revolutionary  party,  at 
the  head  of  which  stood  Karl  Marx.  That  was 
the  Communist  Party.  And  the  evangel  of  the 
present  revolution  is  still  the  one  which  was  writ- 
ten by  Marx  and  Engels."  The  Bolsheviks  are 
the  only  true  exponents  of  Marxism.  Kautsky, 
Hyndman,  Plechanoff,  and  all  non-Bolshevik 
Marxians  have  betrayed  Marx.  Scheidemann 
and  the  German  Majority  Socialists  are,  like  the 
British  Labour  Party,  anathema.  *'  When  the 
German  workers  conquer,  they  will  do  well  to 
hang  Scheidemann  on  the  same  gallows  as  Wil- 
helm."  The  whole  phraseology  of  Bolshevism 
is  borrowed  straight  from  Marx,  and  the  ultimate 
goal  is  the  communist  State,  ''  which  will  destroy 
all  forms  of  government,  including  democratic 
government." 

What  is  interesting  in  the  Bolshevik  experiment 
is  the  machine  which  Lenin  has  created  for  the 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  29 

establishment  of  his  communist  State.  This  ma- 
chine is  based  on  the  famous  "  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat,"  which  is  explained  by  Lenin  in  his 
State  and  Revolution  as  follows:  Throughout 
history  every  form  of  government  has  been  purely 
a  weapon  in  the  hands  of  the  possessing  class  for 
controlling  the  dispossessed  classes.  After  the 
victory  of  the  latter  they,  too,  must  have  such  a 
weapon  until  all  forms  of  opposition  have  been 
destroyed.  In  the  case  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  this  weapon  Is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
transition  stage  until  communism  is  finally  estab- 
lished: 

To  communism,  through  the  dictatorship  of  the  pro- 
letariat—  that  is  our  party  cry.  Dictatorship  means  an 
iron  power,  a  power  which  will  not  spare  its  enemies. 
The  dictatorship  of  the  working  classes  is  a  State  power 
of  the  working-classes  which  will  strangle  the  bourgeoisie 
and  the  land-owners.  .  .  .  That  means  that  you  com- 
munists stand  for  the  employment  of  forcible  oppression? 
Of  course,  we  reply,  we  stand  for  the  employment  of 
revolutionary'  force.  .  .  .  Along  the  path  of  compromise, 
which  the  Mensheviks  and  social-revolutionaries  advocate, 
you  will  find  nothing  good.     (Bucharin.) 

In  the  future  communist  organisation  of  so- 
ciety all  private  property  will  be  abolished.  All 
wealth  will  belong  to  society  as  a  whole,  and  not 
to  individual  classes  or  individual  persons.     All 


30  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

government  will  be  suppressed  except,  apparently, 
*'  a  central  statistical  bureau," 

which  will  decide  how  many  boots,  trousers,  sausages, 
how  much  blacking,  wheat,  cloth,  etc.,  shall  be  produced 
in  a  year;  it  will  further  decide  how  many  comrades 
must  work  in  the  fields,  in  the  sausage  factories,  in  the 
tailors'  workshops.  In  a  corresponding  manner  all  labour 
will  be  distributed.  All  production  will  be  carried  out 
on  a  strictly  calculated  plan,  based  on  the  number  of 
machines  and  agricultural  implements,  the  amount  of 
raw  material  and  the  supply  of  labour.      (Bucharin.) 

Many  people  have  been  attracted  by  the  Ideals 
of  communism,  but  even  the  most  biassed  enthusi- 
ast can  foresee  the  chaos  which  must  Inevitably 
prevail  when  In  an  Ignorant  and  illiterate  country 
an  attempt  is  made  to  introduce  communism 
within  twenty-four  hours  by  a  single  decree  and 
to  establish  It  by  methods  of  violence.  This  at- 
tempt the  Bolsheviks  have  made.  Not  only  have 
they  nationalised  the  banks,  the  factories  and  the 
land,  but  they  have  also  nationalised  all  private 
property,  including  sjiops,  small  holdings,  and 
even  books.  Civil  war  rages  In  consequence  over 
the  whole  country,  and  the  Bolsheviks  are  still 
mainly  occupied  by  their  endeavours  to  muzzle 
and  effectively  to  suppress  their  opponents. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  31 


IV.     The  Bolshevik  Machine 

Without  entering  into  any  complicated  discus- 
sion of  the  various  stages  of  the  civil  war,  let  us 
examine  the  political  machine  which  the  Bolshe- 
viks have  created  for  the  suppression  of  their 
adversaries.  Since  the  Bolsheviks  came  into 
power  as  a  minority  party,  their  government  is 
naturally  built  with  a  careful  regard  for  this  politi- 
cal inconvenience.  Indeed,  it  might  be  pointed 
out  quite  truthfully  that  Russia  has  always  been 
ruled  by  a  minority,  and  in  a  country  like  Russia, 
which  possesses  few  large  cities,  a  small  bour- 
geoisie, a  small  proletariat,  and  an  enormous  dis- 
organised and  almost  totally  illiterate  peasantry, 
the  power  of  a  vigorous  minority  which  controls 
the  industrial  capitals  is  not  easily  challenged. 
The  Bolsheviks  are  opposed  by  all  the  intellectual 
classes,  by  all  the  other  Socialist  parties,  includ- 
ing Anarchists  like  Prince  Kropotkin,  and  by  a 
considerable  majority  of  the  peasantry.  They 
were  at  one  time  supported  by  the  bulk  of  the 
proletariat  of  Petrograd  and  Moscow  and  by  that 
section  of  the  peasantry  which  they  call  the 
*'  peasant  poor,"  and  which  is  to  a  considerable 
extent  composed  of  workmen  who  have  been  sent 
back  to  the  villages  in  consequence  of  the  stop- 


32  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

page  of  the  factories.  But  their  tyranny  and 
maladministration  have  gradually  produced  a 
great  revulsion  of  feeling. 

The  Bolshevik  political  machine  Is  built  ex- 
clusively on  these  elements,  and  more  especially 
on  the  urban  proletariat.  The  following  ex- 
cerpts from  the  official  "  Constitution  of  the  Rus- 
sian Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Republic,"  of  July 
19th,  19 1 8,  show  very  clearly  the  character  of 
the  safeguards  which  the  Bolsheviks  have  created 
in  order  to  secure  a  Bolshevik  majority  and  to 
exclude  all  possibility  of  political  opposition: 

The  all-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  the  supreme 
power  of  the  Russian  Socialist  Federative  Soviet  Re- 
public.    (Paragraph  24.) 

The  all-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  is  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  town  Soviets  In  the  ratio  of  one 
delegate  for  every  25,000  voters  and  of  representatives 
of  the  government  (or  county)  Soviets  in  the  ratio  of  one 
delegate  for  every  125,000  voters.     (Para.  25.) 

(This  paragraph  guarantees  the  predominating  in- 
fluence of  the  urban  proletariat.) 

The  all-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  must  be  sum- 
moned by  the  all-Russian  Executive  Committee  not  less 
than  twice  a  year.      (Para.  26.) 

(The  Congress  meets  in  practice  about  once  every  three 
months.     Its  sittings  last  from  two  to  three  days.) 

The  all-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  chooses  the  all- 
Russian  Executive  Committee  to  the  number  of  not  more 
than  200  delegates.     (Para.  28.) 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  33 

The  Central  Executive  Committee  is  responsible  in 
every  way  to  the  Congress  of  Soviets.  During  the  inter- 
val between  the  Congresses  the  Central  Executive  Com- 
mittee is  the  supreme  authority  of  the  Republic.  (Paras. 
29  and  30.) 

The  Central  Executive  Committee  is  the  legislative, 
administrative  and  controlling  organ  of  the  R.S.F.SrR.. 
(Para.  31.)  -^-.- .:-::. 

The  Central  Executive  Committee  forms  the  Council 
of  People's  Commissars  iox  t\^  general  administration 
of  the  affairs  of  the  R.S.F.K^..     (Para.  35-) 

The  Council  of  Commissars  is  responsible  to  the  Cen- 
tral Executive  Committee,  who  can  control  or  cancel  all 
its  actions. 

Paragraph  64  gives  the  rules  governing  the  elections  to 
the  Soviets.  Both  sexes  over  the  age  of  eighteen  may 
vote  if  they  belong  to  one  of  the  following  categories: 
{a)  All  those  engaged  in  producing  the  necessary  means 
of  life,  and  also  those  engaged  in  household  work  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  above-mentioned  toilers  of  produc- 
tion T—  that  is,  workmen  and  servants  of  all  classes  en- 
gaged in  industry  and  agriculture,  peasants  and  cossacks, 
who  do  not  employ  hired  labour,  {b)  Soldiers  and 
sailors  of  the  Soviet  army  and  navy,  (c)  Citizens  men- 
tioned in  {a)  and  {b)  who  have  lost  their  power  of 
working. 

Then  follows  a  significant  amendment  under  the  head- 
ing of  Note  No.  I. 

Local  Soviets  may,  with  the  approval  of  the  Central 
authority,  lower  the  age  limit  fixed  in  the  present  statute. 

Paragraph  65  gives  the  list  of  those  who  may  not  vote, 
even  if  they  belong  to  the  categories  mentioned  in  Para- 


34  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

graph  64:  (a)  All  people  employing  hired  labour  for  the 
sake  of  profit,  {b)  All  those  who  live  on  profits  not 
made  by  their  own  labour  —  i.  e.,  people  living  on  interest 
from  capital,  income  from  industrial  enterprises  or  from 
property,  (c)  Private  traders,  trade  and  commercial 
agents,  {d)  Monks  and  religious  employees  of  the 
Church,  {e)  Servants  and  agents  of  the  ancient  police 
and  likewise  all  m.embers  of  the  Imperial  Russian  family. 

The  real  safeguard  of  the  Soviet  Constitution,  how- 
ever, is  to  be  found  in  paragraph  23,  which  runs  as  fol- 
lows : 

''  Guided  by  the  interests  of  the  working-class  as  a 
whole  the  R.S,F.R.S.  deprives  certain  individuals  and  cer- 
tain groups  of  their  rights,  ivhich  are  used  by  them  con- 
trary  to  the  interests  of  the  Socialist  Republic/' 

This  statute  is  aimed  at  the  anti-Bolshevik  Socialists, 
and  has  been  applied  with  the  usual  Bolshevik  rigour. 

That  a  system  founded  on  this  principle  should 
be  cruel  is  inevitable.  The  peace  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  has  been  bought  at  the  price  of  civil  war, 
and  the  Bolsheviks,  who  at  one  time  posed  as 
the  champions  of  anti-militarism,  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  adopt  themselves  a  system  of  military 
despotism  based  on  force  and  on  conscription. 
The  attempt  to  obtain  a  volunteer  army  amongst 
the  working  classes  failed  lamentably,  and  the 
Red  Army  of  to-day  is  a  conscript  army  com- 
posed partly  of  foreign  troops,  Letts,  Hungarians, 
and  Chinese,  partly  of  nondescripts  of  all  classes 
and  of  no  particular  political  colour,  who  accept 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  35 

service  In  the  army  because  it  Is  the  easiest,  and 
for  some  the  only,  means  of  procuring  food  and 
clothing  and  the  other  necessaries  of  life.  On 
the  whole,  however,  the  pick  of  the  RedArmy  Is 
to  be  found  In  the  regiments  composed  of  the 
young  workmen  conscripts  from  Petrograd  and 
Moscow,  who  were  at  one  time  Inspired  by  a 
genuine  revolutionary  enthusiasm;  but  even  their 
loyalty  has  been  shaken  by  the  ruthless  suppres- 
sion of  all  personal  liberty.  The  fighting  qual- 
ities of  the  Red  Army  are  very  uncertain,  but 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  during  the  early  months 
of  this  year  a  marked  advance  has  been  made 
both  in  the  way  of  discipline  and  of  military 
efficiency. 

Another  instrument  of  the  Bolshevik  machine 
is  the  censorship,  which  Is  applied  with  a  se- 
verity which  far  outrivals  the  worst  repressions 
of  the  old  regime.  Indeed,  In  spite  of  a  different 
nomenclature,  there  Is  a  close  resemblance  between 
the  present-day  methods  of  the  Bolsheviks  and 
the  worst  periods  of  Russian  reaction.  The  anti- 
Bolshevik  Press,  and  In  particular  the  anti-Bol- 
shevik Socialist  Press,  has  been  hounded  out  of 
existence.  The  right  of  free  speech  and  of  public 
meeting,  so  clamorously  upheld  by  the  Bolsheviks 
during  the  Kerensky  regime,  have  been  violently 
suppressed,   while   a    careless   word   of   criticism 


36  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

against  a  Soviet  Government  may  lead  to  pro- 
scription, incarceration,  and  even  death.  The 
death-sentence  against  which  the  Bolsheviks  once 
thundered  has  been  restored,  and  thousands  of 
people  have  been  put  to  death  without  even  the 
mockery  of  a  trial.  All  forms  of  justice  have 
been  suspended,  and  in  their  place  reign  the  Ex- 
traordinary Commissions.  These  Commissions 
are  an  exaggerated  and  more  powerful  imitation 
of  the  old  Russian  Secret  Police.  They  have  un- 
controlled powers  over  life  and  death  and,  again 
in  imitation  of  the  old  Russian  gendarmerie,  they 
possess  their  own  corps  of  troops.  These  com- 
missions were  appointed  to  deal  with  counter- 
revolution and  speculation,  and  are  undoubtedly 
the  most  powerful  Instrument  in  the  hands  of 
the  Bolsheviks  for  the  suppression  of  all  forms 
of  opposition  and  of  anti-Bolshevik  propaganda. 
It  Is  true  that  by  the  severity  of  their  methods 
they  have  succeeded  in  establishing  a  semblance 
of  order  in  Petrograd  and  Moscow,  that  they 
have  Indeed  put  some  check  on  the  unbridled 
brigandage,  murder,  and  anarchy  which  were  so 
prevalent  during  the  early  months  of  the  Bolshe- 
vik regime,  but  they  are  chiefly  to  be  considered 
as  a  political  force,  and  in  this  respect  their  record 
is  comparable  only  to  that  of  the  Jacobins.     They 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  37 

are  In  fact  the  Instrument  of  the  Terror,  and  the 
ferocity  or  mildness  of  Its  application  In  a  par- 
ticular town  or  district  depends  almost  entirely 
on  the  whims  and  fancies  of  the  President  of  the 
local  Commission. 

While  the  rule  of  the  Bolsheviks  In  the  big 
towns  of  Northern  and  Central  Russia  has  been 
more  or  less  firmly  established,  their  control  over 
the  country  districts  Is  more  uncertain.  The  peas- 
ant, who  In  those  districts  which  have  not  been 
ravaged  by  the  war  has  thriven  materially  during 
the  war,  welcomed  the  Bolshevik  Invitation  to 
seize  the  land  which  for  years  has  been  denied  to 
him.  While  he  undoubtedly  fears  the  return  of 
any  order  which  will  again  deprive  him  of  his 
land,  he  resents  very  strongly  the  communist  de- 
crees which  destroy  all  private  property  and  will 
hand  over  his  implements,  his  live-stock,  and  his 
stores  of  grain  to  the  common  ownership  of 
society  as  a  whole.  He  has,  perhaps,  very  rudi- 
mentary ideas  of  economic  values,  but  he  has  a 
natural  suspicion  of  the  Inferior  paper  money 
which  the  Bolsheviks  are  Issuing  in  such  wild  pro- 
fusion. He  Is  sadly  in  need  of  cotton  goods, 
agricultural  Implements,  and  boots.  In  exchange 
for  these  commodities  he  might  be  willing  to  sell 
his  grain,  but  he  not  unnaturally  refuses  to  sell 


38  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

it  at  the  low  price  fixed  by  the  Bolsheviks  in 
exchange,  not  for  goods,  but  for  money  which  he 
realises  has  no  value. 

This  has  produced  a  deadlock  which  in  view 
of  the  famine  in  the  big  towns  has  had  to  be  over- 
come. Like  all  Bolshevik  remedies,  the  solution 
of  this  problem  has  been  found  in  force.  In 
order  to  create  a  class-feeling  of  hatred  the  Bol- 
sheviks have  divided  the  peasants  into  two  di- 
visions of  rich  and  poor.  Under  the  latter 
heading  are  included  all  who  have  not  sufficient 
grain  for  themselves.  These  are  then  formed 
into  Poverty  Committees  with  the  nominal  task 
of  administering  the  rural  affairs  of  Russia  in  the 
interests  of  the  proletarian  peasants.  In  prac- 
tice they  assist  the  armed  bands  of  Red  Guards 
who  are  sent  down  into  the  villages  to  seize  by 
force  the  grain  from  the  peasants.  These  raids 
are  resisted' by  the  peasants  to  the  best  of  their 
ability  and  are  almost  invariably  accompanied  by 
bloodshed.  The  foreign  Press,  which  has  been 
full  of  the  undeniable  sufferings  of  the  bourgeoisie, 
has  heard  little  of  the  series  of  bloodily  sup- 
pressed peasant  revolts  which  have  taken  place  in 
many  parts  of  Soviet  Russia  since  last  summer. 
It  was  this  question  of  the  Poverty  Committees 
which  caused  the  real  rupture  between  the  Bol- 
sheviks  and  the   left  Socialist-revolutionaries,    a 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  39 

party  In  itself  quite  as  extreme  as  the  Bolsheviks. 
Splrldonova,  their  leader  (since  Imprisoned), 
roundly  accused  Lenin  of  exploiting  the  peasants 
In  the  interests  of  the  urban  proletariat  and  called 
upon  the  former  to  resist  both  the  committees  and 
the  armed  provision  raids.  How  difficult  Is  the 
peasant  problem  for  the  Bolsheviks  may  be  seen 
from  one  of  Lenin's  December  speeches.  This 
speech,  while  justifying  the  creation  of  the  Pov- 
erty Committees,  is  full  of  significant  admissions 
which  may  lead  to  a  temporary  change  in  Bol- 
shevik agrarian  policy.  "  There  Is  no  doubt,"  he 
says,  "  that  in  a  peasant  country  like  Russia  the 
establishment  of  Socialism  is  a  very  difficult  task. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  to  wipe  out  an  enemy  like 
Tsarism,  like  the  big  land-owners,  was  compara- 
tively easy.  In  the  centres  It  was  possible  to 
decide  this  question  In  a  few  days,  throughout  the 
whole  country  in  a  few  weeks,  but  the  task  upon 
which  we  are  now  engaged  can  only  be  accom- 
plished by  an  extremely  long  and  desperate  strug- 
gle. It  Is  clear  that  such  a  reform  as  the 
transformation  of  small  peasant-proprietor  units 
into  a  general  scheme  of  land  socialisation  de- 
mands much  time,  can  in  fact  by  no  means  be 
carried  out  at  once." 

Further  measures  for  suppressing  all  political 
opponents  and  for  starving  them  Into  submission 


40  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

are  to  be  found  in  the  division  of  the  population 
into  four  categories  for  the  purpose  of  food  dis- 
tribution and  in  the  decree  enforcing  forced  labour 
for  the  bourgeoisie.  In  view  of  the  nationalisa- 
tion of  everything,  it  is  obvious  that  one  can  only 
labour  in  a  Bolshevik-controlled  organisation. 
This  is  the  real  explanation  of  the  statement  that 
"  the  great  mass  of  the  professional  and  petty 
bourgeoisie  have  gone  over  to  the  Bolsheviks  dur- 
ing the  autumn."  * 

The  suppression  by  the  Bolsheviks  of  their 
political  opponents,  however,  is  only  one  of  their 
main  activities  and  has  to  be  supplemented  by 
constructive  measures  for  the  furtherance  of  their 
own  programme  and  for  the  winning  over  of  fresh 
supporters.  In  this  connexion  Lenin's  attention, 
as  one  might  naturally  expect,  is  directed  almost 
exclusively  to  the  young  workman  and  the  young 
peasant.  By  a  systematic  suppression  of  all  anti- 
Bolshevik  intellectual  forces  in  the  country  he  has 
taken  great  pains  to  prevent  the  young  urban  and 
rural  proletarians  from  any  contamination  by 
bourgeois  and  "  false  "  socialist  education.  One 
of  his  decrees  provides  for  the  free  education  of 
the  working-classes  and,  although  it  has  naturally 
not  been  possible  to  give  immediate  effect  to  this 
reform,  a  vigorous  commencement  has  been  made 

*  Neiv   Statesman,    December    21,    1918. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  41 

for  the  spread  of  Bolshevik  education  amongst 
the  masses.  A  Socialist  Academy  has  been  es- 
tablished in  Moscow.  This  is  in  reality  nothing 
but  a  school  for  agitators,  and  in  general  con- 
siderable pains  are  taken  to  discover  likely  youths 
amongst  the  peasants  and  workmen.  These 
youths  are  maintained  free  in  the  capitals,  care- 
fully trained  in  Bolshevik  dialectics,  and  then  sent 
back  to  the  factory  and  to  the  village  to  spread 
the  cult  amongst  their  more  ignorant  brethren. 
Meanwhile  all  real  education  has  completely 
broken  down. 

High  wages  are  naturally  a  part  of  the  system, 
but,  in  view  of  the  fantastic  prices  which  prevail, 
the  dearth  of  food  and  goods  of  all  kinds,  the 
break-down  of  production,  and  the  almost  com- 
plete cessation  of  the  value  of  paper  money,  the 
worker  is  in  reality  worse  off  than  in  pre-revolu- 
tion  days.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  taken  for 
granted  that  amid  the  appalling  suffering  which 
is  everywhere  felt  in  Russia  to-day  the  proletarian 
has  more  privileges  than  a  member  of  any  other 
class.  He  is  lodged  in  the  houses  of  the  bour- 
geoisie. Communal  kitchens  have  been  estab- 
lished for  his  benefit,  and  of  such  food  as  is 
available  he  secures  the  chief  share.  Various 
schemes  have  been  adopted  for  his  amusement, 
and  in  addition  to  cheap  theatrical  entertainments, 


42  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

cheap  literature,  all,  however,  on  strictly  class 
lines,  has  been  issued  to  him  in  great  profusion. 
At  the  same  time,  in  the  attempt  to  restore  some 
order  out  of  the  industrial  chaos  which  prevails, 
carefully-disguised  but  nevertheless  firm  measures 
are  being  taken  to  put  some  restraint  on  his 
hitherto  unlimited  Hberty  of  action  and  to  make 
him  submit  to  the  single  and  undivided  will  of 
the  Bolshevik  dictatorship. 

In  this  connexion  the  power  and  influence  of 
Bolshevik  propaganda  as  an  effective  instrument 
of  the  Bolshevik  machine  must  not  be  underesti- 
mated. It  is  indeed  one  of  the  chief  forces  of 
Bolshevism.  No  one  who  has  had  any  contact 
with  Bolshevism  will  deny  the  power  of  its  emo- 
tional appeal,  especially  to  an  ignorant  and  op- 
pressed proletariat  whose  lives  have  been  spent 
in  the  soulless  drudgery  of  the  factory  and  the 
workshop.  The  revolution  in  Russia  has  awak- 
ened in  the  souls  of  thousands  of  these  people  a 
consciousness  of  their  own  power  and  of  their 
own  rights.  It  has  created  in  them  a  spirit  of 
blind  revolt  against  the  old  order  without,  how- 
ever, teaching  them  any  sense  of  their  own  respon- 
Isibilities.  It  is  by  continually  harping  on  the 
wrongs  which  the  working-classes  have  suffered 
and  by  holding  out  extravagant  promises  of  a  won- 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  43 

derful  future  that  the  Bolsheviks  have  maintained 
a  hold  on  their  affections. 

V.     Bolshevik  Propaganda 

Bolshevik  propaganda  may  be  divided  into  two 
distinct  sections :  foreign  propaganda  and  internal 
propaganda.  Very  careful  attention  is  paid  to 
both,  but  there  is  a  marked  difference  in  the 
literary  fare  that  is  provided  for  foreign  con- 
sumption and  for  home  consumption.  The  for- 
eign propaganda  i«  naturally  addressed  to  those 
elements  in  other  countries  whom  the  Bolsheviks 
hope  to  convert  to  an  imitation  of  their  example. 
It  is  a  diplomatic  weapon,  and,  as  in  all  diplomacy, 
it  is  used  not  so  much  for  the  statement  of  its 
own  case  as  for  an  exposure  of  its  opponent's 
weakness.  As  their  ranks  are  full  of  men  who 
have  an  extensive  knowledge  of  the  different  capi- 
tals of  Europe,  the  Bolshevik  Foreign  Office  has 
an  infinitely  better  knowledge  of  labour  conditions 
in  foreign  countries  than  any  other  Foreign  Office, 
and  it  knows  exactly  what  material  will  produce 
the  desired  effect  in  each  particular  country  and 
to  what  particular  section  of  the  community  that 
appeal  must  be  addressed.  Just  as  the  anti-Bol- 
shevik Press  dwells  on  the  horrors  of  the.  Red 


44  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

Terror,  so,  too,  the  Bolshevik  foreign  propaganda 
is  full  of  lurid  details  of  the  atrocities  of  the 
Whites.  Pathetic  pictures  are  drawn  of  a  free 
Socialist  Government  of  the  highest  principles 
being  crushed  out  of  existence  by  the  combined 
efforts  of  the  capitalist  Governments  of  Europe, 
and.  every  effort  is  made  to  convey  the  impression 
that  the  Bolsheviks  are  fighting  the  battle  of 
Progress  against  Tsardom,  as  though  there  were 
no  choice  in  Russia  except  between  Bolshevism  and 
reaction. 

Great  attention  is  paid  to  the  colonial  policy 
of  the  capitalist  Governments,  and  no  pains  are 
spared  to  appeal  to  the  national  aspirations  of 
India,  Egypt,  Persia,  and  Ireland.  Even  China 
is  not  neglected,  and  on  the  propaganda  staff 
of  the  Bolshevik  Foreign  Office  are  men  and 
women  of  almost  every  race  and  colour. 

The  propaganda  for  home  consumption  is 
naturally  of  a  simpler  character.  It  is  directed, 
first  and  foremost,  against  capital  and  the  capi- 
talist Governments  of  the  world;  secondly,  against 
parliamentarism  and  the  futility  of  constitutional 
methods;  and,  thirdly,  against  the  Mensheviks, 
right  social-revolutionaries  and  anti-Bolshevik 
Socialists,  whom  the  Bolsheviks  have  up  to  now 
regarded  as  their  most  dangerous  opponents. 
The  working-classes  are  taught  not  only  that  capi- 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  45 

tal  is  an  evil  thing  in  itself,  but  also  that  capital 
can  only  be  destroyed  by  force  and  that  until  it 
is  so  destroyed  there  can  be  no  improvement  of 
the    workers'    lot^     Particular    attention    is    con- 
centrated upon  England  and  America,  which  as 
strongholds   of  democracy   are   regarded   as   the 
least  fruitful  ground  for  a  Bolshevik  revolution, 
but  which  nevertheless  are  described  as  tottering 
to  their  fall.     Long  articles  appear  almost  daily 
in  the  official  Press  regarding  the  labour  situation 
in  the  chief  allied  countries.     The  British  Labour 
Party    is    described    as    "  worse    than    the    right 
S.R.'s,"  while  great  pains  are  taken  to  illustrate 
the  diminishing  power  of  the  official  Labour  lead- 
ers and  the  rapid  growth  of  the  English  Bolshevik 
movement  amongst  the  rank  and  file.     The  army 
is  told,  and  believes,  that  it  has  conquered  Ger- 
many and  is  now  fighting  the  rest  of  the  world 
and  is  fighting  a  winning  battle.     Genuinely  im- 
bued with  new  ideals  and  new  theories,  the  Bol- 
shevik leaders  are  waging  a  bitter  struggle  against 
all    the    economic    and    social    laws    which    have 
hitherto   governed   mankind.     As    their   theories 
come  into  contact  with  the  hard  facts  of  life  and 
the    weakness    of    human    nature,    the    economic 
obstacles  in  their  path  become  more  and  more 
insurmountable.     Frenzied   enthusiasm   turns   to 
exasperated  desperation  and  desperation  to  vio- 


46  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

lence,  until  world  revolution  becomes  the  only 
panacea  for  the  economic  chaos  which  their 
regime  has  created.  This  is  especially  true  of 
their  financial  policy.  They  have  no  revenue  be- 
yond the  output  of  the  printing-machine  and  con- 
fiscations from  the  bourgeoisie.  The  latter 
source  of  income  is  already  exhausted.  Money 
has  lost  its  value,  and  even  anxious  Bolshevik 
critics  wish  to  know  where  it  will  all  end.  And 
the  reply  is  always  the  same :  Have  patience 
but  a  little  longer.  Your  day  is  coming.  When 
the  international  revolution  is  an  accomplished 
fact,  w^hen  communism  is  finally  established, 
money  will  no  longer  be  required.  In  the  mean- 
time, as  funds  of  some  sort  are  necessary,  any 
means  of  raising  them  are  justifiable,  "  The  fol- 
lowing, for  instance,  is  an  excellent  and  justifiable 
measure :  The  Government  should  declare  that 
by  a  certain  date  all  money  must  be  changed  for 
new  money  and  that  the  old  money  has  lost  its 
value.  This  means  that  everyone  must  dig  out 
his  savings  and  bring  them  to  the  banks.  Then 
we  can  carry  out  a  plan  like  this.  Don't  touch 
the  savings  of  the  poorer  people;  give  rouble  for 
rouble.  Above  a  certain  sum  retain  a  part  for 
government  needs.  For  instance,  up  to  five  thou- 
sand roubles,  give  rouble  for  rouble,  from  the 
next  five  thousand  take  a  tenth  part,   from  the 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  47 

third  five  thousand  a  fifth  part,  and  above  a  certain 
sum  confiscate  all."  (Bucharin.)  It  is  difficult 
to  reconcile  arguments  of  this  kind  with  the  Bol- 
shevik offer  of  commercial  concessions  to  the 
Allies.  Here  again,  however,  it  is  necessary  to 
distinguish  between  fundamentals  and  opportunist 
expedients. 

More  rational  perhaps,  and  therefore  more 
dangerous,  are  the  B?)lshevik  arguments  against 
parliamentarism  and  constitutional  methods.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  at  one  time  there  was 
no  one  so  eager  as  the  Bolsheviks  for  the  im- 
mediate summoning  of  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
Their  action  in  forcibly  dissolving  that  assembly 
when  it  had  furnished  an  anti-Bolshevik  majority 
was  subjected  to  much  criticism,  even  on  the  part 
of  the  proletariat,  who  could  not  understand  so 
sudden  a  volte  face.  The  Bolsheviks  meet  their 
critics  with  the  following  argument: 

The  difference  between  the  Constituent  Assembly  and 
the  Congress  of  Soviets  lies  in  the  fact  that  in  the  former 
not  only  do  the  working-classes  vote,  but  also  the  bour- 
geoisie and  the  agents  of  the  bourgeoisie  {i.e.,  the  anti- 
Bolshevik  Socialists).  In  the  Soviets  the  bourgeois,  the 
former  landowners,  the  bankers,  the  trade-speculators,  the 
merchants,  the  shopkeepers,  the  money-lenders,  the  Korni- 
lofE  intellectuals,  the  priests,  the  bishops,  have  no  vote, 
no  political  rights.     In  the  Constituent  Assembly  may  sit 


48  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

not  only  workmen  and  peasants,  but  also  bankers,  land- 
owners and  capitalists;  not  only  the  communists,  not  only 
the  left  social-revolutionaries,  not  only  even  the  socialist 
traitors  like  the  right  social  revolutionaries  and  the  Men- 
sheviks,  but  also  the  Cadets,  the  Octobrists,  and  the  Black 
Hundred.  The  experience  of  all  countries  shows  that 
where  the  bourgeoisie  enjoys  full  rights  it  always  deceives 
the  poor  and  the  working-classes.  For  instance,  in  all 
countries  where  there  is  a  bourgeois  republic  {e.g.,  in 
France,  in  Switzerland,  and  in  the  United  States),  in 
spite  of  universal  suffrage,  the  supreme  power  is  wholly 
in  the  hands  of  the  financiers.  Thus  it  is  clear  what  the 
right  S.R.'s  and  the  Mensheviks  are  doing  when  they 
wish  to  overthrow  the  power  of  the  Soviets  and  to  call  a 
Constitutional  Assembly.      (Bucharin.) 

Most  interesting  of  all  Bolshevik  propaganda, 
however,  are  the  arguments  employed  against 
the  socialist-patriots,  the  "  socialist-compromis- 
ers," and  the  socialist-pacifists  —  i.e.,  those  who 
are  opposed  to  violent  methods.  All  of  these 
have  been  the  subjects  of  the  most  scathing  at- 
tacks by  the  various  Bolshevik  leaders.  In  this 
connexion  the  "  union  sacree  "  in  France  and  Eng- 
land and  the  International  Socialist  Bureau  have 
incurred  the  bitter  wrath  of  the  Bolshevik 
propagandists.  liuysmans,  Henderson,  Albert 
Thomas,  and  Renaudel  are  all  agents  of  the 
Imperialists.  "  Who  would  seriously  have 
thought,"  writes  Lenin,   "  that  in  one  day  such 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  49 

men  as  Guesde,  Hyndman  and  Plechanoff  would 
have  become  Imperialists  and  betrayed  Social- 
ism? "  "  The  so-called  Executive  Committee  of 
the  International  Socialist  ( ?  )  Bureau  actually 
carries  out,  not  the  decisions  of  the  International 
Socialist  Congresses,  not  the  mandates  of  Social- 
ism, but  the  mandates  of  the  Imperialistic  bour- 
geoisie of  the  Entente"  (Zinoviefi).  The  In- 
dependent Labour  Party  is  described  as  the  party 
"  which  has  never  been  independent,  but  has  al- 
ways been  dependent  on  the  Liberals"  (Lenin). 
The  same  party  is  taken  severely  to  task  for  stat- 
ing that  "  we  do  not  approve  of  armed  revolt 
just  as  we  disapprove  of  all  forms  of  militarism 
and  of  war."  "  Need  I  point  out,"  comments 
Lenin,  "  that  these  anti-militarists  are  quite  the 
worst  kind  of  opportunists?"  The  anti-Bolshe- 
vik Russian  Socialists  are  denounced  as  the 
marionettes  of  Tsardom  and  the  lackeys  of  the 
Entente.  In  fact,  as  the  Bolsheviks  have  truly 
pointed  out,  the  war  has  divided  the  Socialists 
into  two  groups,  the  one  which  favours  the 
establishment  of  Socialism  by  constitutional 
methods,  and  the  other,  the  Bolshevik  group, 
which  denies  the  whole  principle  of  democracy 
and  which  is  frankly  in  favour  of  violent  revolu- 
tion by  means  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  prole- 
tariat.    The   Russian   Bolsheviks  have   declared 


50  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

that  these  two  groups  are  irreconcilable,  and  they 
have  long  ago  begun  a  secret  agitation  for  a  new 
International  from  which  the  socialist  "  compro- 
misers "  will  be  excluded.  This  Socialist  split 
has  already  made  itself  felt  in  every  country  in 
Europe  and  its  inevitable  development  will  be 
marked  with  still  more  bitterness.  "  The  enor- 
mous majority  of  the  so-called  socialists  and  of 
the  representatives  of  the  old  official  socialism," 
writes  Lenin  in  Against  the  Current^  "  have  be- 
trayed the  cause  of  the  working-classes.  At  times 
it  has  seemed  to  us  that  only  a  few  individuals 
like  Karl  Liebknecht,  Friedrich  Adler,  and  John 
Maclean  have  remained  true  to  the  flag  of  Social- 
ism. The  fact  remains  that  '  bourgeois  '  labour 
parties  as  a  political  force  have  been  formed  in 
all  advanced  capitahsl:  countries  and  that  without 
a  determined  and  merciless  struggle  with  these 
parties  or  groups  there  can  be  no  question  either 
of  Marxism  or  of  a  genuine  Socialist  labour  move- 
ment." 

VI.  Conclusion 
The  foregoing  pages  contain,  in  the  writer's 
belief,  a  true  and  accurate  description  of  the  real 
aims  and  aspirations  of  the  Bolsheviks.  No  at- 
tempt has  been  made  either  to  analyse  the  eco- 
nomic results  of  the  Bolshevik  experiment  or  to 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  ^l 

give  harrowing  details  of  the  terrible  suffering 
which  famine,  disease,  and  civil  war  are  causing 
to  all  classes  In  Russia.  The  Bolsheviks  them- 
selves plead  that  It  Is  unfair  to  judge  their  ex- 
periment while  It  Is  still  In  the  transition  stage, 
and  declare  In  extenuation  that  their  work  has 
been  hampered  by  civil  war,  which  has  been  in- 
stigated by  the  Russian  policy  of  both  Germany 
and  the  Allies.  Whether  or  not  the  Bolshevik 
experiment  will  ever  be  successful,  can  ever  be 
successful,  In  a  country  like  Russia  Is  a  matter 
for  speculation.  That  It  has  been  hindered  by 
civil  war  everyone  will  admit.  In  this  connexion, 
however,  one  point  must  be  made  clear.  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  faults  of  Allied  policy 
in  Russia,  it  is  absurd  to  hold  the  Allies  respon- 
sible for  a  civil  war  which,  even  In  the  event  of 
the  strict  neutrality  of  all  Europe,  was  and  is  in- 
evitable. Civil  war  has  been  preached  and  is 
still  being  preached  by  all  the  Bolshevik  leaders, 
and  the  withdrawal  of  the  scanty  forces  which 
the  Allies  at  present  hold  In  Russia  will  not  put 
an  end  to  civil  war.  A  different  Allied  policy 
In  Russia  before  the  Bolshevik  revolution  might 
possibly  have  prevented  that  revolution,  but  no 
pohcy  after  the  event  could  have  modified  It 
except  one  of  force,  which  the  Allies  were 
reluctant  to  employ.     It  is  a  well-known  fact  that 


52  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

the  Allies  are  blamed  just  as  much  by  the  anti- 
Bolshevik  Russians  for  lack  of  support  and  for 
their  policy  of  drift  and  hesitation.  Allied  policy 
during  the  war  was  naturally  governed  by  na- 
tional interests  endangered  by  the  war,  while  Bol- 
shevik policy  was  only  affected  by  the  war  in  so 
far  as  it  helped  or  impeded  the  class  warfare 
which  is  the  alpha  and  omega  of  all  Bolshevik 
policy. 

To-day  the  situation  is  quite  different,  and  the 
Russian  problem  has  now  to  be  dealt  with  purely 
on  its  own  merits.  What  Lenin's  own  views 
of  the  future  may  be  it  is  impossible  to  say.  Pos- 
sibly he  believes  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of  Bol- 
shevism. Perhaps  he  himself  is  already  conscious 
of  its  failure,  but  hopes  by  violent  agitation  in 
other  countries  and  by  driving  home  still  deeper 
the  social  revolution  in  his  own  country  to  make 
a  return  to  the  old  order  of  life  impossible.  He 
has  accepted  the  Allies'  proposal  of  a  conference, 
against  the  wishes  of  Trotsky  and  a  minority  of 
his  colleagues;  and  he  is  reported  to  have  said 
to  the  Moscow  Central  Soviet,  "  We  must  have 
the  courage  to  confess  freely  that  our  Communist 
plan  is  going  unquestionably  to  smash  if  we  do 
not  change  front."  *  But  negotiation  with  the 
Allies  now  as  with  the  Germans  at  Brest-Litovsk 

*  Times,   February   14. 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  53 

is  a  question  of  tactics,  not  of  principles;  his  will- 
ingness to  negotiate  does  not  mean  that  he  Is  any 
less  sincere  or  resolute  In  his  ultimate  aims.  No 
one  who  has  had  any  contact  with  the  Bolsheviks 
will  deny  the  genuineness  of  their  fanatical  en- 
thusiasm. Many  will  point  out  that  their  ex- 
cesses are  in  themselves  the  inevitable  reaction 
after  the  excesses  and  misrule  of  a  preceding 
tyranny.  Many,  too,  will  sympathise  instinctively 
with  the  convulsive  effort  of  the  Russian  proleta- 
riat to  create  a  better  existence  for  themselves,  and 
there  are  many  lessons  in  the  Russian  revolution 
both  for  the  capitalist  and  for  the  socialist. 

Out  of  the  existing  chaos  In  Russia,  however, 
one  fact  stands  clear,  Bolshevism  is  a  tyranny  — 
a  revolutionary  tyranny.  If  you  will  —  which  Is 
the  complete  abnegation  of  democracy  and  of 
all  freedom  of  thought  and  action.  Based  on 
force  and  terroristic  violence,  It  is  simply  follow- 
ing out  the  same  philosophy  which  was  preached 
by  Nietzsche  and  Haeckel,  and  which  for  the  past 
twenty-five  years  has  glorified  the  might  of  force 
as  the  final  justification  of  all  existence.  By  sub- 
stituting one  class  domination  for  another  it  has 
merely  reversed  the  former  tyranny  of  the  Ro- 
manoffs into  a  tyranny  still  more  terrible  and  still 
more  cruel  in  its  one-sldedness.  At  a  moment 
when  the  whole  world  is  straining  forward  to- 


54  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

wards  new  hopes  and  new  Ideals  its  uncompromis- 
ing intolerance  and  its  ruthless  suppression  of  all 
other  forms  of  socialism  and  democratic  progress 
have  narrowed  down  the  socialist  movement  Into 
a  rigid  doctrine  which  is  both  a  weakness  from  the 
socialist  point  of  view  and  a  danger  to  all  ideals 
of  freedom.  In  its  present  form  Bolshevism 
must  either  spread  or  die.  It  certainly  cannot 
remain  stationary.  And  at  the  present  moment  it 
stands  as  a  very  real  menace  to  the  peace  of 
Europe  and  to  any  successful  establishment  of  a 
League  of  Nations. 

This  Is  the  real  problem  which  the  Allied  dele- 
gates in  Paris  have  now  to  face.  Discussions 
between  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  other  Russian 
parties  are  unlikely  to  lead  to  any  definite  result, 
are  unlikely  Indeed  ever  to  take  place,  and  the 
question  of  a  policy  for  Russia  Is  one  that  must 
be  faced  resolutely  and  without  delay.  But 
whether  It  be  a  policy  of  peace  or  of  war,  of 
neutrality  or  of  Intervention,  It  must  be  a  definite 
policy.  Whatever  views  one  may  hold,  no  one 
can  deny  that  the  present  policy  of  doubt  and 
drift  Is  no  policy  at  all.  Not  only  Is  it  by  Its 
obscurity  a  real  danger  to  the  Allied  Governments 
themselves,  but  it  also  aggravates  and  prolongs 
the  agony  and  suffering  of  all  classes  of  the  un- 
fortunate people  of  Russia. 


RUSSIA'S     REVOLT    AGAINST 
BOLSHEVISM 

We  have  now  set  forth  in  some  detail  the 
principles  upon  which  the  Soviet  Government  in 
Russia  is  based  and  the  means  adopted  by  it  for 
carrying  them  into  practice.  The  principles  in 
themselves  are  nothing  new,  being  based  upon  an 
extreme  interpretation  of  the  theories  of  Karl 
Marx;  what  is  new  are  the  methods  adopted  for 
carrying  them  out.  It  is  the  violence  and  brutal- 
ity of  these  methods,  which  have  been  cynically 
enforced  quite  regardless  of  the  wishes  and  pro- 
tests of  the  population,  that  have  made  the  Bol- 
shevist regime  the  object  of  universal  condemna- 
tion in  the  eyes  of  all  sane-thinking  people. 

Perhaps  more  than  any  movement  in  history 
Bolshevism  in  Russia  may  be  described  as  the 
movement  of  one  man  —  Lenin.  This  is  so  much 
the  case  that  Russians  have  often  been  heard  to 
declare  that  Lenin  is  the  only  Bolshevik  in  Russia. 
Exaggerated  as  such  assertions  are,  it  is  at  any 
rate  true  to  say  that,  but  for  Lenin  with  his  ex- 
traordinary personal  and  intellectual  power,  Bol- 

55 


56  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

shevism  would  never  have  taken  its  present  form 
and  would  never  have  held  together  in  the  face 
of  opposition  both  from  within  and  from  with- 
out. The  amount  of  work  he  has  accomplished 
during  the  eighteen  months  of  his  rule  has  been 
little  short  of  marvellous.  Though  during  the 
long  years  of  his  sojourn  abroad  he  had  fully 
elaborated  his  theories  for  the  future  Socialist 
State,  it  was  not  possible  before  the  Revolution 
to  devise  the  machinery  he  would  be  forced  to 
adopt  on  the  spot.  The  Soviets  themselves,  for 
example,  were  no  part  of  his  original  theory.  In 
the  Revolution  of  1905  he  was  opposed  to  the 
formation  of  the  Soviet,  in  which  Trotski  after- 
wards played  so  prominent  a  part,  on  the  ground 
that  the  combination  of  the  whole  Labour  move- 
ment in  a  single  body  would  retard  rather  than 
advance  the  immediate  realisation  of  complete 
Socialism.  Nevertheless,  when  he  arrived  in  Rus- 
sia in  April,  19 17,  and  found  the  Soviets  in 
existence  he  lost  no  time  in  adapting  himself  to 
circumstances,  and  determined  that  it  was  through 
the  Soviets  and  the  Soviets  alone  that  he  must 
work,  first  permeating  them  with  his  ideas  by  skil- 
ful propaganda  and  afterwards  by  methods  of 
violence  making  them  the  faithful  instruments  of 
his  party.  The  Soviet  system  is  only  tolerated 
by  Lenin  in  so  far  as  it  carries  out  the  decrees 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     57 

of  the  Bolshevist  Party  that  dominates  the  Soviets, 
and  it  is  idle  and  fantastic  to  make  any  distinction 
in  practice  between  the  Bolshevist  Party  and  the 
Soviets.  In  many  other  ways,  too,  Lenin  has 
endeavoured  to  adapt  his  theories  to  meet  sudden 
emergencies,  provided  the  main  fabric  of  the 
structure  were  left  undisturbed.  But  in  spite  of 
his  ingenuity  and  the  ability  of  many  of  his  im- 
mediate lieutenants,  in  spite  of  the  exhaustion  of 
the  country  after  the  sufferings  of  the  war,  and 
the  difficulty  of  organising  the  ignorant  masses 
against  the  Bolshevist  Government  once  it  had 
planted  itself  firmly  in  the  saddle,  the  Bolshevist 
system  is  crumbling,  and  its  authors  are  unable, 
either  by  threats  or  by  cajolery,  to  reinstate  it  in 
popular  favour  or  stem  the  growing  resistance 
of  the  Russian  people  themselves  to  them  and  all 
their  works. 

Recent  events  in  Soviet  Russia  have  already 
justified  the  conclusions  drawn  in  the  previous 
chapters.  It  was  clearly  stated  there  that  Bolshe- 
vism was  not  likely  to  succeed  for  long  in  a 
country  in  such  a  backward  state  of  development 
as  Russia.  Though  this  very  fact  might  have 
made  its  initial  success  as  a  destructive  force  all 
the  easier,  yet  when  it  came  to  constructive  effort 
the  failure  would  be  more  complete.  Lenin  him- 
self was  aware  of  this,   and  was  therefore  con- 


^8  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

centrating  his  main  effort  on  maintaining  himself 
in  power  until  he  could  spread  his  doctrines  into 
the  more  advanced  countries  of  Central  Europe. 
His  ultimate  success  would  depend  on  the  results 
achieved  in  this  direction.  "  In  its  present  form 
Bolshevism  must  either  spread  or  die.  It  cer- 
tainly cannot  remain  stationary.'' 

I.     Is  Bolshevism  on  the  Wane? 

So  long  as  the  war  continued  Bolshevism  re- 
mained to  the  average  man  a  purely  Russian  phe- 
nomenon. Whatever  may  have  been  simmering 
under  the  surface  in  other  countries  did  not  catch 
the  eye  or  impress  the  world  as  a  whole  so  long 
as  men  were  engrossed  in  all-important  military 
matters.  In  many  countries,  it  is  true,  there  had 
been  manifestations  of  sympathy  for  Lenin  and 
Trotski  and  for  Bolshevism  in  general  as  a  purely 
revolutionary  force,  and  there  were  some  who 
even  during  the  war  openly  proclaimed  themselves 
Bolsheviks.  But  no  such  movement  showed  any 
real  power  until  it  was  clear  to  the  world  that 
the  greatest  danger  had  been  overcome  and  that 
the  German  military  machine  had  been  smashed. 
Until  then  Liebknecht,  the  real  leader  of  the  Bol- 
sheviks, had  been  looked  on  almost  with  sympathy 
by  those  who,  with  their  attention  engaged  on 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     59 

the  rights  and  wrongs  of  the  war,  classed  him 
with  Bernstein  as  an  enemy  of  Prussian  Militarism 
without  considering  what  he  ultimately  stood  for. 
It  was  the  collapse  of  the  old  regime  in  Germany 
that  suddenly  opened  men's  eyes  to  the  existence 
of  a  dangerous  Bolshevist  movement  in  that  coun- 
try, a  movement  that  stood  for  the  same  principles 
as  the  Soviet  Government  in  Moscow  and  advo- 
cated the  same  violent  methods  for  carrying  them 
into  effect. 

It  was  not  till  then  that  Bolshevism  appeared 
in  its  true  light,  not  as  a  Russian,  but,  as  it 
claimed  itself  to  be,  an  international  movement. 
The  reaction  in  each  country  was  almost  instan- 
taneous. Those  who  had  hitherto  failed  to  grasp 
the  significance  of  Bolshevism  so  long  as  it  was 
Isolated  in  a  country  so  little  understood  by  the 
general  public  as  Russia  rushed  to  the  other  ex- 
treme and  began  to  denounce  the  Labour  move- 
ment in  each  country  as  Bolshevik.  Some  of  the 
speeches  made  in  England  by  Coalition  candidates 
on  the  eve  of  the  General  Election  showed  traces 
of  this  misunderstanding,  and  there  were  few 
things  that  did  so  much  good  to  the  Bolshevist 
cause  in  that  country  as  the  thoughtless  way  in 
which  the  Labour  Party  was  denounced  as  Bolshe- 
vik and  some  of  Its  most  respected  leaders,  such 
as  Mr.  Henderson,  branded  as  "  Bolshies." 


6o  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

Since  that  time,  perhaps,  the  average  man  has 
learnt  more.  The  intoxication  of  victory  has 
passed  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  many  of  the 
unwise  things  said  at  the  General  Election  have 
been  forgotten.  Bolshevism  has  for  some 
months  past  engaged  the  attention  of  all  thinking 
men  and  women  in  a  way  it  never  did  before;  and, 
in  spite  of  exaggerations  and  misstatements  about 
the  Russia  Bolsheviks  that  inevitably  find  their 
way  into  the  press  from  time  to  time,  the  main 
facts  about  Bolshevism  are  now  widely  known 
and  there  is  less  tendency  to  label  men  as  Bolshe- 
viks who  both  by  their  words  and  their  actions 
repudiate  all  connection  with  the  opprobrious 
epithet.  Yet,  if  there  is  still  a  tendency  to  con- 
fuse anti-Bolshevist  Socialists  with  Bolsheviks, 
the  blame  rests  partly  with  the  former  for  not 
having  made  their  attitude  sufficiently  clear,  and, 
perhaps  for  this  very  reason,  an  analysis  of  what 
has  taken  place  in  Russia  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Socialist  parties  may  help  to  clarify  the  situation 
so  far  as  Bolshevism  and  Internationalism  are 
concerned. 

Outside  Russia  the  leading  Bolshevist  move- 
ments that  have  come  out  into  the  open  and  sig- 
nified their  formal  alliance  with  Lenin's  Govern- 
ment are  the  Spartacist  movement  in  Germany, 
the  Communist  Government  in  Buda-Pest  and  the 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     6i 

Italian  Official  Socialist  Party.  In  other  coun- 
tries, such  as  France,  Holland,  Sweden,  Norway 
and  even  Great  Britain,  there  are  small  groups 
that  adhere  to  Bolshevism,  but  as  yet  no  well- 
organised  party  has  made  its  appearance.  For 
the  present,  therefore,  the  success  of  Bolshevism 
in  Europe  must  be  judged  by  the  success  of  Spar- 
tacism  in  Germany,  of  Communism  in  Hungary 
and  in  a  much  less  degree  of  the  Official  Socialist 
Party  in  Italy. 

Spartacism  in  Germany  since  the  German  Revo- 
lution has  had  rather  a  different  history  from  Bol- 
shevism in  Russia  since  the  Revolution  there.  It 
has  shown  the  same  energy  and  violence  as  its 
Bolshevist  model,  and  it  has  had  the  example  of 
Lenin  to  guide  it,  being  able  to  profit  as  in  Russia 
by  the  disastrous  economic  consequences  of  the 
war.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  had  several  dis- 
advantages that  Bolshevism  in  Russia  did  not 
have  to  contend  with.  The  Russian  Bolsheviks 
were  able  to  stand  for  immediate  peace  while 
their  opponents  stood  for  the  continuation  of  the 
war;  the  German  Spartacists,  on  the  contrary, 
are  the  enemies  of  peace  and  it  is  the  conclusion 
of  peace  with  the  Western  Powers  that  the  Ger- 
man people  want.  There  is  again  no  acute  land 
question  in  Germany  as  in  Russia,  and  the  Sparta- 
cists  are   not   able   to  make   any   appeal   to   the 


62  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

peasantry  that  would  for  the  time  being  bring 
the  majority  of  the  population  over  to  their  side. 
But  the  most  important  factor  is  the  strength  of 
the  German  bourgeoisie  and  the  high  percentage 
of  educated  people  in  Germany  who  see  through 
the  theories  of  the  Spartacists  and  do  not  believe 
in  their  experiments.  Thus,  in  spite  of  their 
extraordinary  energy,  the  Spartacists  have  not 
met  with  the  rapid  success  which  was  necessary 
for  them;  any  delay  tells  against  them  and  they 
know  it,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  from  their 
point  of  view  they  were  right  in  making  their  bid 
for  power  as  soon  as  they  did  in  Germany.  In 
Berlin  they  made  two  attempts  and  on  both  occa- 
sions they  were  defeated.  It  was  only  in  Munich 
that  they  met  with  any  temporary  success,  and 
here  too  they  have  now  collapsed,  leaving  behind 
them  a  record  that  will  not  inspire  other  parts  of 
Germany  to  follow  their  example.  There  may 
no  doubt  be  other  outbreaks  of  Spartacism  in 
Germany,  but  the  Spartacists  have  no  leaders  of 
outstanding  ability  such  as  Lenin,  and  the  great 
body  of  public  opinion  in  Germany,  profiting  by 
the  lesson  of  Russia,  is  solid  against  them,  ex- 
cept as  a  counsel  of  utter  despair.  In  Germany, 
at  any  rate,  unless  the  Allies  deliberately  foment 
it,  Bolshevism  is  discredited  and  is  now  on  the 
wane.     Bolshevism  thrives   only  on  success   and 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     63 

continuous  success,  and  cannot  survive  the  re- 
peated failures  it  has  already  met  with  in  Ger- 
many. 

In  Hungary,  too,  as  far  as  can  be  judged  at 
the  moment  of  writing,  the  Communist  Govern- 
ment has  ended  in  a  fiasco.  It  is  probably  true 
to  say  that  Communism  there  was  stronger  before 
it  came  into  power  than  afterwards.  The  pres- 
tige of  Count  Karolyi's  Government  had  gone, 
and  many  people,  for  purely  national  reasons, 
may  have  been  prepared  to  welcome  a  new  ex- 
periment to  test  its  effect  on  Western  Europe. 
For  that  very  reason  there  was  a  feeling  of 
uneasiness  in  many  quarters  lest  General  Smuts  s 
mission  to  Buda-Pest  might  increase  the  prestige 
of  Bela-Kun's  fantastic  Government,  but  later 
events  and  the  firm  line  of  action  pursued  by  the 
Allies  have  removed  these  fears  and  exposed  the 
inherent  weakness  of  Bolshevism  when  faced  with 
any  armed  force  backed  by  a  determined  Govern- 
ment. The  failure  of  Bolshevism  both  in  Ger- 
many and  Hungary  has  gone  far  to  ruin  Bolshe- 
vist prestige  in  Europe;  and  Bolshevism  is  find- 
ing itself  more  and  more  driven  back  into  Russia, 
there  to  defend  itself  against  the  population  over 
which  it  has  tryrannised  so  ruthlessly  for  more 
than  eighteen  months. 


64  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 


II.     The  Bolshevist  Government  and  Peace 

If  the  prestige  of  Bolshevism  in  Europe  has 
suffered,  what  has  been  the  effect  in  Russia?  A 
great  deal  will  depend  on  the  course  of  events 
in  the  near  future,  but  to  understand  the  position 
it  is  necessary  to  review  the  recent  history  of 
Bolshevist  prestige  In  Russia.  At  the  time  of 
the  armistice  with  Germany  Bolshevist  prestige 
was  extraordinarily  low.  It  was  clear  to  every 
intelligent  Russian  that  the  defeat  of  Germany 
had  been  due  to  the  superior  strength  of  the 
Allied  armies,  and  It  was  universally  expected 
that  a  small  portion  of  the  victorious  troops  would 
instantly  be  diverted  to  Russia.  Mothers  com- 
forted their  children  in  Petrograd  Vv^ith  the  as- 
surance that  soon  the  English  would  be  coming, 
and  the  Bolshevist  authorities  there  were  making 
every  preparation  for  evacuating  the  city.  Time 
passed  and  nothing  was  done;  even  the  opening 
of  the  Dardanelles  made  no  appreciable  differ- 
ence. So  the  Bolsheviks  took  heart  again,  and, 
when  the  Peace  Conference  opened  Its  sittings 
in  Paris  in  January,  Lenin  had  had  time  to  devise 
a  new  policy  to  suit  the  turn  of  events.  Peace 
overtures  were  made  to  the  Allies  and  hints  were 
given  that  the  Soviet  Government  was  prepared 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     65 

to  grant  concessions.  It  was  in  this  atmosphere 
that  the  Prinkipo  proposal  was  launched.  To 
the  Bolsheviks  it  seemed  too  good  to  be  true  and 
their  first  impulse  was  to  see  in  it  nothing  but  a 
trap.  They  therefore  hesitated  to  give  any  reply, 
until  it  became  clear  to  them,  from  the  indigna- 
tion of  their  opponents,  that  the  proposal  meant 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  what  it  said,  and  that 
here  was  a  way  of  regaining  their  prestige  in 
Russia  and  discomfiting  their  opponents.  In 
Siberia,  at  Archangel,  and  in  the  South  of  Russia, 
there  was  a  feeling  of  anger  and  despair,  only 
relieved  when  it  became  evident  that  the  Prinkipo 
proposal  had  lapsed  and  that  nothing  further  was 
likely  to  come  of  it. 

Meanwhile,  however,  Lenin  was  not  idle.  His 
peace  propaganda  became  more  active.  Stories 
were  spread  of  the  strength  of  the  Red  Army  and 
the  way  the  other  Socialist  parties  in  Russia  were 
uniting  with  the  Soviet  Government  against  Ad- 
miral Kolchak  and  against  any  form  of  foreign 
intervention.  At  the  same  time  the  press  con- 
tained many  references  to  the  visit  of  certain 
American  journalists  to  Moscow,  who,  it  was  said, 
had  brought  back  to  Paris  terms  of  peace  from 
Lenin. 

These  rumours  were  finally  dispelled  by  the 
British  Prime  Minister's  welcome  speech  in  the 


66  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

House  of  Commons,  in  which  he  definitely 
repudiated  any  idea  of  recognising  the  Soviet  Gov- 
ernment and  reiterated  his  intention  of  supporting 
those  Russian  forces  opposed  to  it. 

It  is  our  business  (he  declared),  since  we  asked  them  to 
take  this  step,  since  we  promised  support  to  them  if 
they  took  this  step,  and  since  by  taking  this  stand  they 
contributed  largely  to  the  triumph  of  the  Allies,  it  is  our 
business  to  stand  by  our  friends.  .  .  .  Therefore  I  do 
not  in  the  least  regard  it  as  a  departure  from  the  funda- 
mental policy  of  Great  Britain  not  to  interfere  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  any  land  that  we  should  support  General 
Denikin  and  Admiral  Kolchak. 

Such  a  direct  statem.ent  from  the  Prime  Min- 
ister should  mean  a  final  blow  to  Bolshevist  pres- 
tige in  Europe,  followed  as  it  has  been  by  the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Governments  in  Munich 
and  Buda-Pest.  It  now  remains  for  Russia  to 
shake  herself  free  from  the  malady  that  has  not 
only  ruined  her  but  has  been  disturbing  the  peace 
of  Europe  for  many  months  past.  It  is  not  only 
the  future  of  Russia  that  is  at  stake  in  the  struggle 
against  Bolshevism  in  Russia,  but  the  future  of 
Europe  also,  for  until  Russia  is  restored  and  able 
to  resume  her  normal  relations  with  the  civilised 
world  there  can  be  no  real  peace  in  Europe,  neither 
can  the  League  of  Nations  be  erected  on  a  firm 
and  lasting  foundation.     If  only  for  that  reason 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     67 

the  struggle  that  Russians  are  now  making  in  the 
North,  in  the  East  and  in  the  South  against  Bol- 
shevist oppression  should  engage  the  interest  of 
the  whole  world. 

III.    The  Anti-Bolshevist  Movement  in 
Russia 

At  the  beginning  of  November  19 17  the  Bol- 
shevist movement  in  Russia  came  on  a  wave  so 
swift  and  unexpected  that  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment was  swept  off  its  feet  quite  unprepared 
to  cope  with  the  situation.  Most  people  ex- 
pected that  it  would  disappear  almost  as  quickly 
as  it  had  come  when  once  an  armed  force  was 
organised  against  it.  But  November  and  Decem- 
ber passed  and  the  opposition  melted  away.  It 
was  only  in  Southern  Russia,  where  General 
Alexeyev  had  rallied  round  him  a  few  hundred 
officers,  that  any  opposition  was  even  visible. 
The  Cossacks,  who  had  been  regarded  as  the 
bulwark  against  Bolshevism,  collapsed  without  a 
struggle  and  went  over  to  the  other  side,  and 
before  long  the  Bolsheviks  spread  throughout 
Siberia  and  made  themselves  masters  of  Kiev. 

It  was  then  that  the  Germans  intervened  in 
spite  of  the  Peace  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  checked 
the  spread  of  Bolshevism  farther  West.     They 


68  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

occupied  Kiev  and  In  the  name  of  Ukrainian  In- 
dependence pushed  their  armies  forward  as  far 
as  the  Don  on  the  East  and  the  Government  of 
Kursk  on  the  North.  There  were  signs  at  one 
time  that  they  contemplated  occupying  Moscow 
and  restoring  the  monarchy,  and  It  Is  generally 
believed  that  their  ambassador  at  Moscow,  Herr 
Helfferlch,  advised  taking  this  step.  Whatever 
steps,  however,  the  Germans  may  have  taken  to 
overthrow  Bolshevism  In  different  parts  of  Russia 
have  no  connection  with  the  genuine  Russian  iVntl- 
Bolshevlst  movements.  General  Alexeyev,  and 
after  him  General  Denlkin,  consistently  refused  to 
receive  any  support  or  to  come  to  any  terms  with 
the  Germans  and  made  It  known  that,  should  the 
Germans  approach  the  territory  controlled  by  the 
Volunteer  Army,  they  would  be  opposed  in  exactly 
the  same  way  as  the  Bolsheviks.  General  Kras- 
nov,  It  Is  true,  was  not  so  uncompromising,  but 
the  Volunteer  Army  condemned  his  actions,  and 
there  was  constant  friction  between  the  Volunteer 
Army  and  the  high  command  of  the  Don  Cos- 
sacks until  General  Krasnov  was  removed  some 
months  ago. 

The  first  Anti-Bolshevist  organisation  in  Russia, 
apart  from  the  Volunteer  Army  In  the  South, 
came  into  being  in  Moscow  about  April  191 8. 
As  the  Bolsheviks  suppressed  any  public  organisa- 


Russians  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     69 

tlons  opposed  to  their  regime,  any  such  bodies 
had  to  be  secretly  organised  and  their  very  exist- 
ence remained  a  secret  during  the  whole  of  the 
summer  of  19 18.  It  was  not  until  later,  v/hen 
the  individual  members  of  the  organisation,  find- 
ing It  impossible  to  continue  work  in  Moscow, 
scattered  to  different  parts  of  Russia,  to  the 
North,  to  the  South,  and  to  Siberia,  that  the 
existence  of  the  body  they  had  represented  be- 
came publicly  known. 

The  National  Centre,  which  was  formed  in 
Moscow  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  19 18, 
was  a  coalition  of  various  political  parties  and 
organisations.  It  consisted  chiefly  of  members  of 
the  Cadet  Party  and  Moderate  Socialist  parties 
such  as  the  Right  Social  Revolutionaries,  the 
Populist  Socialists  and  the  Right  Mensheviks,  as 
opposed  to  the  Menshevik  Internationalists, 
headed  by  Martoff,  who  has  now  come  to  terms 
of  a  sort  with  the  Soviet  Government.  It  also 
included  a  large  organisation,  known  as  the 
Union  for  the  Regeneration  of  Russia,  which  was 
Socialist  In  character.  Its  object  was  to  co-op- 
erate with  the  Anti-Bolshevist  movement  in  East- 
ern Russia  which  had  arisen  as  a  result  of  the 
action  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  with  the  Volunteer 
Army  in  Southern  Russia,  and  with  the  Provi- 
sional Government  of  those  parts  of  Northern 


70  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

Russia  which  were  freed  from  the  Bolsheviks  on 
the  arrival  of  the  Allied  expedition.  The  im- 
mediate object  was  to  co-ordinate  the  policy  of 
all  the  Anti-Bolshevist  movements,  the  main 
principle  being  the  restoration  of  order  by  armed 
force  and,  when  that  had  been  accomplished,  the 
summoning  of  a  Constituent  Assembly  to  deter- 
mine the  future  form  of  government. 

IV.     The  Movement  in  Siberia 

The  movement  in  Siberia,  though  it  came  into 
existence  at  a  later  stage  than  that  in  the  South 
of  Russia,  is  the  most  important  and  may  be 
dealt  with  first.  It  is  perhaps  more  directly  con- 
cerned with  the  work  of  the  National  Centre  in 
Moscow  in  the  summer  of  1918.  In  order  to 
disentangle  the  history  of  what  happened  at 
Omsk  in  November  19 18  it  is  essential  to  trace 
the  movement  back  to  the  plans  elaborated  by  the 
National  Centre  in  Moscow. 

When  the  Soviet  Government  in  Petrograd  dis- 
solved the  Constituent  Assembly  in  January  19 18, 
a  temporary  Siberian  Government,  which  was 
purely  Socialist  in  character,  was  established  at 
Tomsk.  This  Government  had  but  a  short  ex- 
istence. It  collapsed  before  the  Bolshevist  wave 
that  swept  right  across   Siberia.     The  members 


Russians  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     71 

of  the  Government  disappeared,  some  retiring 
into  the  background,  others  making  their  way  to 
Vladivostok. 

The  success  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  in  Western 
Siberia  meant  the  reappearance  of  the  old  Siberian 
Government  that  now  took  up  its  headquarters  at 
Omsk.  This  Government  was  headed  by  Volo- 
godski,  a  Sfberlan  lawyer,  but  was  less  Socialist 
and  more  bourgeois  than  the  former  Government 
which  had  been  dispersed  by  the  Bolsheviks.  The 
reason  for  this  was  that  the  •  new  Government 
was  a  compromise  between  the  Social  Revolu- 
tionaries and  the  military  elements  that  had  be- 
gun to  form  the  nucleus  of  a  Russian  army  to 
fight  the  Bolsheviks.  Admiral  Kolchak  became 
Minister  of  War  in  the  new  Siberian  Govern- 
ment, having  come  from  the  Far  East  as  soon 
as  communication  had  been  opened  up  between 
Omsk  and  Vladivostok. 

Meanwhile  in  Eastern  Russia  a  new  Govern- 
ment had  been  formed  in  the  territory  liberated 
by  the  Czecho-Slovaks  east  of  the  Volga.  The 
conflict  between  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  the 
Bolsheviks  came  to  a  head  at  the  end  of  May; 
and  by  July  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  joined  by  a  small 
Russian  force,  called  the  "  People's  Army,"  had 
occupied  Syzran,  Samara,  Simbirsk,  and  even 
Kazan.     These  successes,  though  they  were  not 


72  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

maintained  for  long,  led  to  a  meeting  on  Sep- 
tember 24  at  Ufa,  in  the  rear  of  the  Czecho- 
slovak front,  when  an  All-Russian  Directory,  con- 
sisting of  Vologodski,  Avksentyev,  Chaikovski, 
Astrov,  and  General  Boldyrev,  was  established. 
Soon  afterwards  the  Directory  moved  its  head- 
quarters from  Ufa  to  Omsk. 

The  compromise  adopted  at  Ufa  contained  no 
elements  of  permanence.  According  to  the  com- 
promise the  Directory  was  to  be  the  All-Russian 
Government,  while  the  Omsk  Government,  which 
was  in  reality  a  very  much  stronger  body,  was 
to  be  merely  a  "  business  "  Siberian  Government 
for  the  purpose  of  local  administration.  The 
establishment  of  the  Directory,  In  which  the  So- 
cial Revolutionaries  were  all-powerful,  Zenzinov 
having  taken  the  place  of  Astrov  who  had  gone 
to  the  South  of  Russia  to  join  General  Denikin, 
was  not  In  accordance  with  the  arrangements  made 
by  the  National  Centre  in  Moscow,  which  had 
aimed  at  a  much  broader  coalition  of  parties  under 
the  supreme  command  of  General  Alexeyev. 
Moreover,  the  subordinate  position  Into  which  the 
Omsk  Government  was  forced  did  not  meet  with 
any  favour  from  the  military  elements  who  were 
convinced  that  the  new  Socialist  Directory  would 
never  succeed  In  building  up  a  strong,  well-discl- 
pHned  army,  the  prime  necessity  of  the  movement. 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     73 

These  suspicions  were  still  further  aggravated  by 
the  insidious  propaganda  of  Chernov,  the  evil 
genius  of  the  Social  Revolutionary  Party. 

It  was  clear  that  sooner  or  later  a  change  was 
inevitable.     Officers,  who  had  been  serving  in  the 
so-called  "  People's  Army  "  on  the  Volga  front, 
which  had  been  practically  controlled  by  the  So- 
cial   Revolutionaries,    had    made    their    way    to 
Omsk,  and  were  determined  to  secure  some  form 
of  Government  which  would  definitely  break  with 
the  committee  system  in  the  army  and  ensure  the 
enforcement  of  strong  military  discipline.     In  the 
Omsk  Government  there  was  one  man,  Admiral 
Kolchak,  who,  both  by  his  character  and  ability, 
was  singled  out  as  the  only  man  capable  of  as- 
suming supreme  control.     On  November  i8  the 
change  took  place.     During  the   previous   night 
Avksentyev  and  two  other  Socialist  members  of 
the  Directory  were  arrested  by  a  group  of  Cos- 
sack officers.     A  meeting  of  the  Siberian  Govern- 
ment was  then  held  to  discuss  the  situation.     It 
was  decided  that  the  Directory  had  collapsed  and 
that  its  powers  should  henceforth  be  concentrated 
in  the  hands  of  one  man  —  Admiral  Kolchak  — 
who  thereupon   assumed  the   title   of  Verkhovni 
Pravitel  (Supreme  Regent). 

Irregular  as  such  a  coup  d'etat  may  have  been, 
it  may  be  said  in   defence  that  the   times  were 


74  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

irregular,  and  that  the  Directory,  elected  by  only 
a  small  group  of  former  members  of  the  Constit- 
uent Assembly  at  Ufa,  had  no  better  constitu- 
tional basis  to  govern  the  whole  of  Russia  than 
Admiral  Kolchak  possessed.  The  one  thing 
needed  was  a  firm  hand  to  organise  an  army  and 
an  administration,  and  it  was  obvious  that  the 
Directory  would  never  succeed  in  doing  this.  Ad- 
miral Kolchak's  action  has  since  been  justified 
by  success;  for  he  has  not  only  achieved  a  re- 
markable series  of  victories  In  the  field,  but  has 
rallied  the  vast  majority  of  the  population,  includ- 
ing the  important  Co-operative  Societies,  to  his 
side. 

Since  Admiral  Kolchak  assumed  ofHce  there 
have  been  no  further  political  crises  in  Siberia. 
The  Government  is  In  the  hands  of  a  strong  ruler 
and  its  success  depends  upon  his  wisdom  and 
ability.  Kolchak  was  not  hitherto  widely  known 
even  in  Russia.  He  had  played  no  part  in  poli- 
tics and  it  was  uncertain  how  he  would  shape. 
Determined  he  would  certainly  be,  but  would  it 
be  the  determination  of  a  Napoleon  or  a  George 
Washington?  A  recent  letter  from  Siberia  char- 
acterises him  as  follows:  "Kolchak  is  a  great 
man.  He  Is  cultured,  not  ambitious  at  all,  with 
great  moral  force,  highly  strung  and  an  ardent 
patriot.     In  internal  political  and  purely  Army 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     75 

matters,  of  which  he  knows  very  little,  he  is  very- 
careful,  listens  to  advice,  consults  people,  reflects 
over  it  and  never  acts  on  impulse.  Certainly  he 
makes  mistakes,  but  he  recognises  them,  alters 
them  and  does  not  insist  on  them." 

Admiral  Kolchak  has  had  a  difficult  path  to 
tread  during  the  last  few  months  and  it  would 
be  idle  to  pretend  that  all  is  well  with  the  admin- 
istration. There  are  still  many  abuses  to  be  re- 
moved and  many  defects  in  organisation,  but 
those  who  have  been  on  the  spot  report  that  there 
is  a  new  atmosphere  of  hope,  that  confidence  is 
being  restored,  justice  has  been  re-established, 
taxes  are  being  collected,  and  now  that  a  begin- 
ning has  been  made  there  is  a  determination  to 
carry  the  work  through. 

Admiral  Kolchak  has  defined  in  various  public 
addresses  the  main  outlines  of  his  political  pro- 
gramme. When  accepting  power  from  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ministers,  he  said: 

Accepting  this  cross  of  power,  in  extremely  difficult 
conditions  of  civil  war  and  utter  disorganisation  of  the 
State  life,  I  declare  to  the  population  that  I  will  follow 
neither  the  road  of  reaction  nor  the  disastrous  way  of 
party  politics.  My  chief  aims  are  the  creation  of  a 
strong,  fighting  army,  victory  over  Bolshevism,  and  the 
establishment  of  law  and  order  founded  on  right.  This 
will  enable  the  nation  to  choose  freely  the  sort  of  Gov- 


76  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

ernment  it  prefers  and  to  realise  the  great  ideals  of  free- 
dom now  proclaimed  throughout  the  whole  world. 

In  a  further  speech  at  the  end  of  February  he 
declared: 

In  the  Russia  that  is  to  be  only  a  democratic  regime 
is  possible.  The  main  task  of  the  Government  is  to  es- 
tablish universal  suffrage  in  the  sphere  of  democratic  self- 
government,  and  thoroughly  progressive  legislation  in  the 
sphere  of  labour  and  agrarian  questions. 

On  the  land  question  he  has  made  equally  sat- 
isfactory  statements: 

The  two  years  of  revolution  have  implanted  in  me  the 
firm  conviction  that  the  land  question  cannot  be  left  in 
its  former  condition,  but  must  be  reviewed  and  based 
on  new  principles.  These  principles  are  a  matter  for  the 
future  National  Constituent  Assembly;  the  present  Gov- 
ernment can  only  solve  the  question  practically  as  occasion 
arises.  My  Government  regards  it  as  an  indisputable 
fact  that  small  peasant  proprietorship  is  the  base  of  the 
countr>^'s  prosperity  and  the  Government  will  aid  it  at  the 
expense  of  the  large  owners. 

He  has  further  pledged  himself  to  the  election 
of  a  Constituent  Assembly,  when  order  has  been 
restored,  in  the  following  words: 

I  declare  to  you  that  the  aim  of  the  Government  which 
I  represent  is  to  give  to  the  country,  so  sorely  tried  by 
the  Revolution,  order,  right  and  law,  and  to  secure  for 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     77 

the  Russian  people  an  opportunity,  without  violence  from 
any  party,  freely  to  declare  its  will  through  a  Constituent 
Assembly. 

V.     The  Volunteer  Army  in  Southern 
Russia 

In  the  first  days  of  the  Bolshevist  revolution 
in  Petrograd  General  Alexeyev  made  his  way  to 
Novocherkassk  In  the  South  of  Russia  and  gath- 
ered round  him  a  handful  of  officers.  The  Don 
and  Kuban  Cossacks  had  not  at  that  time  suc- 
cumbed to  the  infection  of  Bolshevism  and  it  was 
hoped  that  among  the  Cossacks  a  rallying-ground 
might  be  found  against  the  Bolsheviks.  About 
a  month  afterwards  Alexeyev  was  joined  by 
Kornlloff  who  had  escaped  from  imprisonment  in 
Bykhov.  They  soon  took  up  their  headquarters 
at  Rostov  and  entered  into  close  relations  with 
Kaledin,  the  Ataman  of  the  Don  Cossacks  at 
Novocherkassk.  At  that  time  the  Volunteer 
Army  under  Alexeyev  and  Kornlloff  numbered 
only  a  few  hundred  and  was  provided  neither 
with  munitions  nor  other  military  equipment. 

The  hopes  they  had  placed  on  the  steadfastness 
of  the  Don  Cossacks  were,  however,  soon  belied. 
The  Bolsheviks  made  active  propaganda  amongst 
the  young  Cossacks  and  misrepresented  to  them 


78  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

the  aims  of  their  leaders  and  of  the  Volunteer 
Army  Generals.  The  Cossacks  are  an  independ- 
ent people.  They  have  always  led  somewhat  of 
a  roving  existence  and  for  that  very  reason  under 
the  old  regime  they  enjoyed  a  status  altogether 
different  from  that  of  other  communities  in 
Russia.  It  is  true  that  the  theories  of  Bolshevism 
were  not  likely  to  m.ake  any  lasting  appeal  to  them, 
but  the  spirit  of  revolt  was  in  the  air  and  the 
Bolsheviks  were  prepared  to  use  this  spirit  for 
their  own  purposes.  Kaledin,  seeing  the  appar- 
ent hoplessness  of  the  position,  shot  himself  on 
February  1 1  at  Novocherkassk,  perhaps  in  the 
hope  that  this  might  bring  the  Cossacks  to  their 
senses.  His  tragic  death  did  have  a  momentary 
effect  on  them;  for  a  few  weeks  they  rallied,  but 
then  again  the  same  spirit  of  disorder  gained  the 
upper  hand. 

A  few  days  after  Kaledin's  death  the  Volun- 
teer Army  was  forced  to  move  its  headquarters 
from  Rostov  to  the  Stavropol  Government. 
Their  forces  at  this  time  numbered  not  more 
than  2,600  all  told.  Here,  without  any  sanitary 
arrangements  and  constantly  harassed  by  Bolshe- 
vist bands  which  controlled  the  main  roads  and 
railways,  they  kept  up  a  dogged  resistance  entirely 
cut  off  from  any  means  of  help.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  March  news  reached  them  that  the  Kuban 


Russians  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism      79 

Government  had  fallen  and  that  the  Bolsheviks 
were  masters  of  Ekaterinodar.  Korniloff,  rein- 
forced by  Kuban  detachments  that  had  fled  from 
Ekaterinodar,  determined  to  retake  the  city.  On 
April  13  the  decisive  battle  was  fought  for  its 
possession.  The  Volunteer  Army  was  unsuccess- 
ful and  was  forced  to  retreat,  Korniloff  having 
been  killed  on  the  field  of  battle. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Volunteer  Army 
heard  the  welcome  news  that  the  Don  Cossacks 
had  risen  in  revolt  against  the  Bolsheviks.  Novo- 
cherkassk changed  hands  several  times,  but  was 
finally  held  by  the  Cossacks.  Meanwhile  the  Vol- 
unteer Army,  in  spite  of  its  recent  reverse  at 
Ekaterinodar,  was  gradually  growing  in  numbers, 
officers  making  their  way  from  Roumania  and 
the  Ukraine  to  join  them.  During  the  next  few 
months  Denikin,  who  had  succeeded  Korniloff  in 
the  command  of  the  Volunteer  Army,  organised 
the  army  into  a  real,  modern  fighting  force.  The 
Germans,  meanwhile,  since  he  had  refused  to 
come  to  any  arrangement  with  them,  endeavoured, 
by  many  devious  ways,  to  hamper  his  organisa- 
tion of  the  army. 

In  the  summer  Denikin,  having  captured 
Bataisk,  again  advanced  into  the  Kuban  district, 
and,  after  a  series  of  battles,  Ekaterinodar  came 
into  his  hands  on  August  15.      From  Ekaterino- 


8o  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

dar  he  advanced  to  Novorossisk  on  August  26, 
thus  reaching  the  coast  of  the  Black  Sea.  Dur- 
ing the  autumn  and  winter  Denlkin  gradually 
cleared  Kuban,  Stavropol  and  the  Northern 
Caucasus  of  the  Bolsheviks. 

The  history  of  the  Don  Cossacks  during  the 
summer  of  191 8  was  rather  different  from  that 
of  the  Volunteer  Army.  The  German  troops, 
having  penetrated  as  far  as  the  Donets  basin, 
came  Into  touch  with  the  Don  Cossacks  at  Novo- 
cherkassk, and  it  was  through  their  Influence  that 
the  reactionary  General  Krasnov  was  appointed 
Ataman  of  the  Don.  The  agreement  was  that 
the  Germans  would  supply  him  with  munitions 
against  the  Bolsheviks,  the  former  hoping  that 
through  the  Don  they  might  bring  over  the  Vol- 
unteer Army  to  their  side.  In  this,  however, 
they  were  unsuccessful,  and,  by  the  time  of  the 
armistice  in  November  19 18,  the  Don  Cossacks 
were  able  to  shake  themselves  altogether  free 
from  German  influence. 

Once  the  Germans  had  disappeared,  closer  re- 
lations were  established  between  Denlkin  and  the 
Don  Cossacks,  but  Krasnov's  reactionary  policy, 
and  that  of  the  reactionary  generals  and  poli- 
ticians by  whom  he  was  surrounded,  led  to  con- 
stant friction  between  his  staff  and  that  of  the 
Volunteer  Army.     This  was  only  removed  when 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     8i 

Krasnov  retired  early  in  19 19  and  General  Bo- 
gayevski,  who  had  previously  fought  in  the  Vol- 
unteer Army,   took  his  place.     Bogayevski   lost 
no  time  in  making  it  clear  that  from  hencefor- 
ward the  army  of  the  Don  Cossacks  would  work 
in  the  closest  accord  with  the  Volunteer  Army. 
The  military  history  of  the  Volunteer  Army 
is  an  epic  even  more  romantic  than  the  exploits 
of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  in  Siberia.     The  difficul- 
ties they  had  to  overcome  were  enormous,   and 
on  many  occasions  one  would  have  thought  the 
stoutest    hearts    must    have    failed.     The    chief 
credit  is  due  to  Alexeyev,  who  organized  the  army 
during  the  most  difficult  months  until  his  death 
from  strain  and  overwork  on  October  8,   19 18, 
and  to  Denikin,  who,  since  he  succeeded  Alexeyev, 
has  held  the  army  together  both  by  his  soldierly 
quahties  and  his  political  commonsense.     As  far 
back  as  August    19,    19 18,   Denikin   defined  the 
aims  of  the  Volunteer  Army  in  the   following 
words: 

The  Volunteer  Army  cannot  become  a  weapon  for  one 
or  another  political  party  or  public  organisation.  Then 
it  would  cease  to  be  Russia's  State  Army.  The  Army 
will  never  try  to  restrain  other  people's  thoughts  and 
consciences.  The  Army  says  to  you  simply  and  honestly: 
"  Whether  you  belong  to  the  Left  or  the  Right,  love  your 
tortured  native  land  and  help  to  save  her." 


82  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

General  Denlkin's  present  Administration  with 
its  headquarters  at  Ekaterinodar  should  not  be 
regarded  as  an  independent  Government;  it  is 
purely  of  a  temporary  character  designed  to  facili- 
tate the  work  of  the  Volunteer  Army  until  union 
is  effected  with  Kolchak's  troops,  as  Denikin  has 
openly  placed  himself  under  the  authority  of 
Kolchak.  The  Administration  itself  that  is  at- 
tached to  the  Volunteer  Army  represents  all 
shades  of  political  opinion,  from  Mr.  Sazonov 
to  Messrs.  Astrov  and  Stepanov,  both  of  whom 
are  Cadets  and  members  of  the  National  Centre. 
The  main  lines  of  the  policy  of  the  Administra- 
tion, as  published  in  the  Times  on  May  5,  are 
the  following:  (i)  Abolition  of  Bolshevist  an- 
archy and  institution  of  law  and  order;  (2)  Re- 
construction of  a  powerful,  united  and  indivisible 
Russia;  (3)  Convocation  of  a  People's  Assembly 
based  on  universal  suffrage;  (4)  Decentralisation 
by  means  of  wide  regional  autonomy  and  liberal 
local  self-government;  (5)  Guarantee  of  full  civil 
and  general  freedom;  (6)  Immediate  agrarian  re- 
forms with  a  view  to  meeting  demands  for  land  by 
the  working-classes;  (7)  Immediate  Labour  leg- 
islation, securing  the  working-classes  from  exploit- 
ation by  the  Government  or  by  capitalists. 


Russians  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism      83 


VI.     The  Provisional  Government  in 
Northern  Russia 

The  Provisional  Government  in  Northern 
Russia,  comprising  the  Archangel  and  Murmansk 
areas,  came  into  existence  at  the  beginning  of 
August  191 8  at  the  time  of  the  Allied  expedition. 
Chaikovski  was  chosen  as  head  of  the  new  Gov- 
ernment and  the  Ministry  formed  by  him  con- 
sisted almost  entirely  of  Social  Revolutionaries. 
Chaikovski  himself  is  a  veteran  member  of  the 
Social  Revolutionary  Party  and  before  he  pro- 
ceeded to  Archangel  was  in  association  with  the 
National  Centre  in  Moscow.  The  policy  pur- 
sued by  his  Government  is  based  on  the  decisions 
formulated  in  Moscow  and  closely  follows  the 
declarations  of  Kolchak  which  have  already  been 
quoted.  The  main  principles  are  the  armed 
struggle  against  the  Bolsheviks  until  they  have 
been  overthrown,  and,  when  this  has  been  accom- 
plished, the  summoning  of  a  Constituent  Assem- 
bly. All  the  evidence  goes  to  show  that  the  Gov- 
ernment, which  has  since  its  formation  been  re- 
modelled on  a  broader  basis,  closely  reflects  the 
wishes  of  the  local  population. 


84  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 


VII.     The  Russian  Representatives  in  Paris 

The  Governments  of  Admiral  Kolchak,  Gen- 
eral   Denikin    and    Mr.    Chalkovski    include    the 
whole  of  the  Russian  forces  at  war  with  the  Bol- 
sheviks.    There  are  other  Anti-Bolshevist  forces 
in    the    field    consisting    of    Esthonians,    Letts, 
Lithuanians  and  Ukrainians,  but  so  far  there  is 
no  co-ordination  between  them  and  the   Russian 
forces,  nor  are  their  aims  the  same.     The  peoples 
of  the  Baltic  Provinces  and  the  Ukrainians  all 
claim  complete  independence  of  Russia  and  refuse 
even  to  discuss  the  question  of  federation.     As  a 
result  of  the  collapse  of  the  former  Russian  State 
the  doctrine  of  self-determination  has  run  riot  in 
Russia,  and  new  national  formations  have  come 
into  existence  which,  before  the  Bolshevist  Revo- 
lution, never  claimed  anything  more  than  federa- 
tion.    It  is  clear  that  no  one  formula  can  cover 
these   several  problems   and  that   each   of  them 
must  be  settled  on  its  merits.     There  are  many- 
interests    to    be    considered  —  national,    political 
and   economic  —  and   it   is   certain  that   Russian 
interests   cannot   be    completely   ignored   without 
causing  trouble  in  the   future.     If  a  solution  is 
to  be   found   in   Paris   it  would  be   as  well   for 
the   future  security  of  the  territories  concerned 


Russians  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     85 

that  it  should  not  fly  in  the  face  of  the  declara- 
tions already  made  by  the  official  representatives 
in  Paris  of  the  Russian  Governments,  who,  even 
though  their  Governments  have  not  Been  recog- 
nised by  the  Allies,  can  rightly  claim  to  speak  for 
the  whole  of  the  Anti-Bolshevist  forces  in  Russia. 
The  Russian  representatives  in  Paris  have 
formed  themselves  into  a  small  central  committee 
presided  over  by  Prince  Lvov,  who  is  assisted  by 
Mr.  Sazonov,  Mr.  Maklakov,  and  Mr.  Chalkov- 
ski.  Prince  Lvov  represents  the  former  Provi- 
sional Government,  of  which  he  was  the  first 
Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Sazonov  the  Governments  of 
Admiral  Kolchak  and  General  Denikin,  and  Mr. 
Chalkovski  the  Government  of  Northern  Russia. 
So  long  as  no  Russian  Government  is  officially 
recognised  by  the  Allies  the  representatives  of 
Russia  have  not  been  admitted  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, but  the  Russian  Committee  has  explained 
its  views  on  the  main  questions  concerning  the 
future  territories  of  Russia.  The  Russian  point 
of  view  on  the  self-determination  of  the  border 
nationahties,  with  the  exception  of  Poland  and 
Finland,  the  latter  having  now  been  recognised 
by  both  the  British,  French  and  American  Gov- 
ernments, is  as  follows:  "  They  are  prepared  to 
regard  as  de  facto  Governments  the  authorities  set 
up  by  these  nationalities,  in  so  far  as  they  are 


86  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

Inspired  by  democratic  principles  and  enjoy  the 
support  of  the  population  they  govern,  and  they 
are  in  consequence  ready  to  give  their  assistance 
to  these  nationalities  in  the  matter  of  their  political 
and  economic  organisation."  Though  this  dec- 
laration has  not  been  accepted  by  the  nationalities 
concerned,  who  still  maintain  their  demand  for 
complete  independence,  it  might  perhaps  provide 
a  basis  for  further  negotiation. 

VIII.     Conclusions 

The  foregoing  sketch  of  the  Anti-Bolshevist 
movements  in  Russia  has  endeavoured  to  show 
how  the  opposition  to  the  Bolsheviks  took  shape 
and  along  what  lines  it  has  developed.  The  Bol- 
sheviks by  their  uncompromising  and  irreconcil- 
able attitude  drove  every  other  party  into  violent 
opposition  and  united  many  who,  under  the 
Provisional  Government,  had  been  unable  to  sink 
their  differences.  Amongst  the  non-Socialist 
parties  in  Russia  there  were  certainly  never  any 
illusions  about  the  Bolsheviks,  and  those  parties 
who  stood  to  the  Right  of  Kerenski  frequently 
urged  him  to  adopt  more  vigorous  measures 
against  them.  But  before  the  Bolshevist  Revo- 
lution all  -members  of  the  Soviet  were  leagued 
together  under -the  name  of  *'  tovarishchi ''  (com- 


Russia's  Revolt  Against  Bolshevism     87 

rades),  and,  no  matter  how  far  removed  they 
were  from  one  another  in  policy,  there  was  with 
the  majority  a  strong  disinclination  to  take  action 
against  any  tovarishch  for  fear  that  domestic 
differences  within  the  Socialist  parties  might  lead 
to  the  triumph  of  the  hated  burzhui  (bourgeoisie). 
Apart  from  small  groups  of  Socialists,  such  as 
those  who  rallied  round  Plekhanov,  the  Soviet 
as  a  whole,  even  when  it  was  predominantly 
Menshevik,  refused  to  take  stock  of  its  actual 
position  and  sever  all  connection  with  the  extreme 
Left,  whose  policy,  it  was  known  even  at  that 
time,  was  entirely  incompatible  with  that  of  the 
main  body  of  Socialist  opinion. 

This  lesson  was  not  learned  until  it  was  too 
late;  until  the  Bolsheviks  had  dispersed  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  and  openly  taken  their  stand 
against  Social  Democracy.  It  was  not  till  then 
that  Socialist  opinion  united  against  the  Bolshe- 
viks, who  singled  out  their  opponents  in  the  So- 
cialist camp  for  exceptionally  harsh  punishment. 
These  founders  of  the  Third  International,  who, 
to  show  their  complete  dissociation  from  the 
"  Social-traitors "  of  the  Second  International, 
erased  the  name  of  Social-Democrat  from  their 
programme,  have  ever  since  covered  with  abuse 
the  Socialists  of  the  whole  world  who  have  not 
completely  thrown  In  their  lot  with  them.     And 


88  Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals 

yet  in  other  countries  leading  Socialists,  such  as 
M.  Longuet  in  France,  still  work  for  an  under- 
standing with  the  Third  International.  While 
advocating  the  re-establishment  of  the  Second  In- 
ternational, they  favour  a  policy  that  would  grad- 
ually merge  it  in  the  Third.  Even  when  the 
Bolshevik  tovarishch  brands  his  Socialist  oppo- 
nent as  an  enemy  and  a  traitor,  the  latter  refuses 
to  break  the  spell  that  would  bind  them  all  to- 
gether under  the  misleading  name  of  tovarishchi. 
So  long  as  Anti-Bolshevist  Socialists  continue  this 
nominal  connection  with  the  Bolsheviks  It  is  not 
surprising  that  those  who  do  not  examine  closely 
the  differences  between  them  should  be  inclined 
to  class  them  all  as  Bolsheviks. 

It  is  this  which  lies  at  the  back  of  much  of  what 
has  happened  in  Russia  since  the  organised 
struggle  against  Bolshevism  began,  and  it  goes  a 
long  way  towards  explaining  the  reason  for  Kol- 
chak's  coup  d'etat  in  November  191 8.  Cher- 
nov's internationalism  was  an  impossible  weapon 
with  which  to  combat  Bolshevism;  if  Russia  was 
to  be  restored  and  liberated  from  the  Bolsheviks 
it  could  only  be  done  by  a  vigorous  national  and 
patriotic  movement.  That  is  the  essence  of 
Kolchak's  programme,  and  those  Socialists  who 
take  their  stand  on  a  national  basis,  as  do  Mr. 
Chaikovski  and  many  others,  are  prepared  to  sup- 


Bolshevik  Aims  and  Ideals  89 

port  the  alms  which  both  Kolchak  and  Denlkin 
have  proclaimed. 

Simply  because  the  Anti-Bolshevist  movements, 
as  represented  by  Kolchak  and  Denikin,  have  put 
the  question  of  firm  government  and  a  strong 
military  force  in  the  forefront  of  their  pro- 
gramme, many  people  have  jumped  to  the  con- 
clusion that  they  are  reactionaries.  Many  Eng- 
lish Liberals  have  taken  up  this  cry  and  tend  to 
sympathise  more  with  those  who  are  content  with 
wholesale  professions  of  democracy  than  with 
those  who  make  vigorous  action  their  main  ob- 
ject. Russian  Liberals,  who  in  principle  accept 
the  same  democratic  programme  as  advanced 
Liberals  in  this  country,  are  rightly  indignant 
when  their  present  attitude  meets  with  constant 
suspicion  here.  They  see  the  dangers  threaten- 
ing their  country,  the  ignorance  and  demoralisa- 
tion of  the  masses,  and  the  urgent  necessity  for 
a  firm  hand  in  restoring  and  maintaining  order 
until  Russia  has  had  time  to  breathe  again  and 
recover  her  balance.  They  do  not  wish  to  re- 
peat the  mistakes  of  the  Provisional  Government 
and  lead  their  country  back  again  on  the  road 
which  ends  in  anarchy. 


PRINTED    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    OT    AMERICA 


^fp^^Pfrnfff""**^?^ 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 


LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


REC'D  LD 


\m  1 5  1959 


-^5)^'^^ 


5 


flP 


vjHi 


i  a   iSbu 


m 


^ 


cbk: 


»T      ore  1  274 


ftgC'D'c^"  R- 


jAN^r  "i;^ 


itsS^ 


REC'D  LB 


APR  24 1962 


% 


^ 


^ 


fl^ 


19  "66    9^ 


.^t(S)iii^^ 


pr^f'i >^  ^''  -^ 


p£B?4'67-9PW 


UOAN 


deht. 


DECJ6l974a^ 


LD  21A-50m-9,'58 
(6889sl0)476B 


General  Libra' 
University  of  Cal* 

Berkeley  /2 


U.C.BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


CDMS^^MStD^ 


405958 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


H*     1^*^w/-  .    5i 


